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Localism and Involuntary Annexation: 
Reconsidering Approaches to 
New Regionalism 
Christopher J. Tyson* 
''Involuntary" annexation-the ability of cities to expand their tem"to1y unilaterally by 
extending their boundaries-JS one of the most controversial devices in land use law. It is under 
attack in virtually every state where it exists. Involuntary annexation is a direct threat to 
"loca/Jsm," the belief in small, autonomous units of government as the optimum /Orum /Or 
expressing democratic freedom, /Ostering community, and organizing local govemment. 
Localism has been justifiably faulted with spuning metropolitan fragmentation and the 
attendant challenges it creates for regional govemance. This cn"tique JS at the center of "New 
Regionalism," a movement of scholars and policy makers rocused on promoting regional 
govemance stroctures that respect the cultural draw of localism while correcting ror its 
deficiencies. New Regionalism emphasizes bottom-up, voluntaJy govemance structures and 
dis1111sses approaches like involuntary annexation as politically infrasible. Both t;pes o[ 
approaches !ace considerable political challenges, but there are aJgUEJb/y more examples of well­
fimctioning involuntary annexation regimes than there are successful models of New 
Regionalism. U.11ile involuntary annexation has been cn"tical to the success of metropolitan 
regions in Texas and North Carolina, many regard it as a violation of the liberty and freedom 
that comes with property dghts. Property nghts are rooted in instinctive and culturally 
reinforced notions of personal identity and the inviolability of ownership. Localism extends this 
logic to mllllicipal identity. The hostJJity toward involuntary annexation, thererore, can be 
understood as a response to the taking of a persons perceived dght to express individual identity, 
gmup identity, status, and ownership through municipal identity. This notion of municipal 
JdenD/y as property threatens to undennine both existing involuntary annexation regimes as well 
as future New Regionalist proposals. While New Regionalism has well-reasonedjustificatJ011s 
for rocusing on more-voluntary, bottom-up govemance structures, involuntary annexation 
remains a potent tool ror facilitating regional governance and is worthy of defense and 
preservation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of state and local government law is less about 
substantive legal doctrine than it is about institutional design. Decisions 
that affect localities can be made at a variety of levels-federal, state, or 
local-and by a variety of institutions-executive, administrative, 
legislative, or judicial-within each level. State and local government 
law involves the location of decision-making authority within this 
matrix. The subjects that define this area of law-such as the scope of 
municipal autonomy and the resolution of interlocal conflict and 
cooperation-are primarily interesting not for their substantive content, 
that is, what should be decided, as much as for what they say about who 
should decide.1 
The metropolitan-boundary problem has long been a defining 
issue in local government law.2 Increasingly, metropolitan regions are 
arranged around municipal boundaries that separate central city and 
suburban local governments from each other. The result is a 
patchwork of governments throughout a region. This fragmentation 
1. See, e.g., Clayton P Gillette, Expropriation and Institutional Design in State and 
Local Govemment Law, 80 VA. L. REv. 625, 625 (1994). 
2. See, e.g, Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62 SrAN. 
L. REV. 931 (2010) (suggesting state-level reforms to provide local governments with better 
tools to address regional problems); Richard Briffault, The Local Govemment Boundary 
Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1115 (1996) (discussing the inability of 
local governments to address regional issues); Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Govemmen� 
.
115 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1763 (2002) (proposing that the solution to regional governance problems 
is a European Union-like institution made up of local governments); Christopher J. Tyson, 
Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the Age of Mobile Capital, 73 
PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
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not only leads to the uneven distribution of regional burdens and social 
stratification, but it allows provincialism to fiustrate interregional 
collaboration and metropolitan development.3 Moreover, different 
metropolitan municipalities take on identities that r eflect disparate 
levels of market value, social worth, political power, and cultural 
meamng. 
Social and consumer behavior within metropolitan regions 
responds to these dynamics. For instance, the choice of where to 
pur chase or rent a home is typically linked to other decisions that 
ultimately impact quality of life, wealth creation, social status, political 
power, and perceived safety and well-being.4 This drives the decision­
making process around locating in the central city, suburb A, or suburb 
B. Consequently, municipal boundaries define the territorial and 
socially constructed bounds of community and locational choice. 
They facilitate wildly esoteric, yet painfully tangible and 
consequential, distinctions between communities that signal value to 
the market as well as to civil society. They inform the design and 
operation of local government law at foundational levels--chiefly in 
the development of the laws governing municipal-boundar y formation 
and reformation. Municipal-boundary laws-specifically a state's 
annexation laws-are central to how locational value is created and 
preserved. 
The impact of location decisions on local government law has 
been explored in the zoning context.5 How municipal-boundary laws 
impact these social and economic processes, however, receives less 
attention. Annexation laws regulate the manner and degree to which 
municipal boundaries can be extended. Most states require some form 
of popular sanction by the residents or property owners living in an 
3. See, e.g. , Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part D-Localism and Legal Theory, 
90 COLUM. L. REv. 346, 357-64 (1990) (discussing the social and demographic changes that 
influenced the evolution of the legal classification of suburbs and the manner in which it has 
limited the ability of metropolitan regions' central cities to grow). 
4. There has long been a national policy supporting home ownership and 
considerable federal resources have been dedicated to creating accessible, stable, and 
appreciating residential markets. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2. 0, I 02 
Nw. U. L. REv. 1047 (2008) (proposing a comprehensive system of risk allocation to improve 
homeownership as an investment for homebuyers). 
5. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David Schleicher, The Steep Costs of Using 
Noncumulative Zoning To Preserve Land for Urban Manufacturing, 77  U. Cm. L. REV. 249 
(2010) (arguing against noncumulative zoning as a means to promote urban manufacturing); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 1 9  GEO. MASON L. REV. 63 7 
(2012) (discussing the tension between zoning laws and the private market for location). 
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area proposed for annexation before the annexation can take effect.6 
This enables residents who migrate out of a central city to stop the 
central city's expansion into the unincorporated areas where they have 
resettled. Central city emigration typically involves wealthier residents 
who are highly mobile and often hostile to wealth redistribution. They 
typically pay more in taxes than they require in government services. 
Consequently, their exit from the central city diminishes its tax base. It 
is in the central city's best interest to recapture these residents and their 
tax dollars. Expanding the taxable territory is the only way for a 
central city to fund existing public service and amenity levels as well 
as maintain its share of redistributed state and federal funds. 
Consequently, annexation law has emerged as a bulwark against the 
ability of metropolitan-area central cities to expand their territory in a 
manner that allows them to balance the books. 
Not all states have conditioned boundary expansion on popular 
support. There are a few states that have taken specific measures to 
limit the possibility that their central cities will be boxed in by the 
suburban municipalities formed on their borders by giving them 
unilateral or near-unilateral power to extend their boundaries.1 
"Involuntary" annexation-also known as "forced" or "unilateral" 
annexation-is a subset of annexation law that allows a municipality to 
extend its borders to encompass new territory without the consent of 
the residents or property owners in the annexed area. Seven states 
have some version of this feature in their annexation regimes: Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas. 
In all seven of these states, involuntary annexation provisions have 
faced or are facing some level of organized opposition.8 
The controversy over involuntary annexation stems from widely 
held beliefs about the relationship between government, territory, 
identity, and freedom. In the minds of most Americans, being in the 
right school district, neighborhood, suburb, or district affects individual 
and family life chances and outcomes. The location decisions made by 
individuals, families, and firms alike incorporate presumptions about 
wealth, privilege, poverty, disadvantage, status, and stigma.9 
6. See, e.g., Mary M. Edwards, Understanding the Complexities of Annexation, 23 
J. PLAN. LITERATURE 1 19, 124 (2008). 
7. See, e.g., Russell M. Smith, An Examination of Municipal Annexation Methods 
in North Carolina, 1990-2009, 52 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 1 64, 1 66-67 (2012). 
8. See infra Part II. 
9 · See generally Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the l)'ranny of the 
Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barners to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000) 
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Consequently, the real and perceived consequences of these 
distinctions ascribe a level of risk to location choice. This notion of 
risk reflects relative levels of financial and political access, freedom, 
and authority that accrue to an individual or family based on the 
implications of their location choice or municipal identity. 
Municipal identity is more than the unincorporated territory or 
local government unit within which one's property is located. It 
encompasses notions of value and worth that operate in the modern 
metropolis and that are attached to a particular municipality. 
Municipal identity implicitly involves matters of real property and by 
extension, notions of fundamental rights in and to the municipal 
identity attached to real property. How municipal identity operates is 
inextricably tied to municipal boundaries because it is given legal and 
political force through the design of a state's annexation regime.10 
Using involuntary annexation to limit location choice offends 
widely held values of liberty, freedom, and property rights popularly 
and culturally understood as municipal identity. This phenomenon has 
been characterized as "localism," and the hostility toward involuntary 
annexation illustrates the manner in which localism has come to be 
expressed through the logic, rhetoric, and methodology of properiy 
rights.11 While there is no recognized constitutional property right to 
local self-government, the rhetoric of property rights dominates the 
arguments against involuntary annexation and frames the public's 
conception of municipal identity as property.12 Understanding these 
(arguing that a "favored quarter" of the population in most metropolitan areas has captun:d 
most of the benefits of the regional economies). 
10. See, e.g., so urces cited supra note 2. 
11. See infra Part Ill. 
12. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part 1-lhe Structure' oF Lorn! 
Govermnent Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. I, 7-8 (1990) ("As a matter of conventional legal 
theory, the states enjoy complete hegemony over local governments. Under both fcJeral and 
state constitutional law, local governments have no rights against their states. Localities may 
not assert the contracts clause, the equal protection clause or the privileges and immunities 
clause against their state governments. Nor do the residents of local governments have any 
inherent right to local self-government: local residents may not assert a constitutional claim 
to belong to a particular local government or to have any local government at all. The formal 
legal status of a local government in relation to its state is summarized by the three concepts 
of 'creature,' 'delegate' and 'agent.' The local government is a creature of the state. lt exists 
only by an act of the state, and the state, as creator, has plenary power to alter, expand. 
contract or abolish at will any or all local units. The local government is a delegate of the 
state, possessing only those powers the state has chosen to confer upon it. Absent any 
�pecific limitation in the state constitution, the state can amend, abridge or retract any power 
tt has delegated, much as it can impose new duties or take away old privileges. The local 
government is an agent of the state, exercising limited powers at the local level on behalf of 
the state. A local government is like a state administrative agency, serving the state in its 
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developments is important for the emerging discussion on "New 
Regionalism," which has largely discounted annexation's role m 
remaking metropolitan governance. 
New Regionalism promotes the voluntary accession of 
metropolitan governments into region-wide governance structures that 
control some, if not all, of the functions of metropolitan governance. 
New Regionalism encourages the collaborative and participatory 
development of bottom-up remedies to address the inequality that 
results from metropolitan fragmentation. New Regionalism prefers 
that local governments choose to cede power voluntarily to a region­
wide entity, which runs counter to the decidedly top-down, state­
imposed design of involuntary annexation.13 
Annexation, in general, is controversial, but involuntary 
annexation is viewed by many as extreme. It is understandably 
susceptible to criticism for being politically infeasible, which explains 
the lack of attention it receives from New Regionalist scholars and 
policy makers.14 Ironically, New Regionalism's push for a movement 
toward regional governance structures has, to date, proven to be just as 
politically dubious as expanding involuntary annexation. The latter, 
however, has proven useful in mitigating the effects of urban sprawl 
and metropolitan fragmentation.15 
Although involuntary annexation is under attack in the states 
where it remains, it deserves to be preserved and included in the New 
Regionalist discussion of pathways to more comprehensive and 
equitable forms of metropolitan governance. If this is to happen, 
however, it is necessary to understand how the legitimacy of localism 
and the attendant notions of property rights in municipal identity have 
narrow area of expertise, but instead of being functional specialists, localities are given 
jlllisdictions primarily by territory, although certain local units are specialized by function as 
well as territory." (footnotes omitted)). 
13.  See Lisa T. Alexander, The Promjse and Penis of"New Reg1ona11st" Approaches 
to Sustainable Conmnmjties, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 632-33 (2011) ("New regionalism 
has been defined as 'any attempt to develop regional governance structures or interlocal 
cooperative agreements that better distribute regional benefits and burdens."' (quoting 
Cashin, supra note 9, at 2027-28)). Minnesota's Minneapolis-St. Paul ("Twin Cities") region 
is frequently lauded as a model of regional governance and an example of the New 
Regionalist ideal. Since 1994, the Metropolitan Council of the Twin Cities has exercised 
jurisdiction over all sewer, transit, and land use planning for the seven counties and 188 cities 
within the Twin Cities metropolitan region. See, e.g., MYRON 0RFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A 
REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 13 (1997); J anice c. Griffith, Regional 
Governance Reconskiered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 532-33 (2005) . 
. . 
1 4. 
.
S.ee Cashin, supra note 9, at 2027 ('The 'New Regionalist' agenda accepts the 
poht1cal fut1hty of seeking consolidated regional government."). 
15. See intm Part III. 
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developed and been sustained in a manner that has undennined the 
legitimacy of involuntary annexation as a worthwhile component of 
not only statewide land use regimes, but also the scholarly discourse 
around metropolitan governance. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of the existing state 
annexation regimes that permit involuntary annexation and the various 
designs of involuntary annexation provisions in those states. Part III 
considers the various ideological, political, and legal underpinnings of 
the backlash to involuntary annexation. Specifically, this Part explores 
the broader antistatist and property rights foundations of localism. It 
also introduces and explores the idea of municipal identity as property. 
Part IV addresses the manner in which involuntary annexation has 
been omitted from the broader New Regionalism debate. 
II. OVERVIEW AND HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY ANNEXATION 
Annexation is a significant area of local government law 
affecting the ability of cities to retain residential and business 
taxpayers who settle outside of the city's municipal boundaries but 
within its metropolitan region.16 Urban historian Kenneth Jackson has 
stated, "Without exception, the adjustment of local boundaries has 
been the dominant method of population growth in every American 
city of consequence."11 Boundary expansion was the largest driver of 
municipal expansion in the second half of the twentieth century, with 
almost four-fifths of 521 central cities expanding their boundaries by 
10% or more between 1950 and 2000.18 Recent data released by the 
United States Census Bureau show that "more than 93,000 
annexations occurred in the United States between 2000 and 2010, 
resulting in the addition of over 8 million acres of territory to existing 
municipalities.''19 
Virtually every state's annexation regime provides more than one 
method for annexing land, and most provisions require the consent of 
the property owners in the area proposed for annexation. In the states 
where annexation is the most controversial, the controversy is almost 
16. Annexation law is controlled by the states, and therefore, there are fifty different 
approaches to annexation. For a discussion of annexation, see, for example, David Rusk, 
Annexation and the Fiscal Fate of Cities, in THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION METROPOLITAN 
POLICY PROGRAM 1, 9-11 (2006). 
17. KENNETH J. JA CKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 140 (1985). 
18. DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS : A CENSUS 2000 UPDATE 12 (3d ed. 
2003). 
19. Smith, supra.note 7, at 165. 
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always due to involuntary annexation provisions.20 No two states' 
involuntary annexation provisions are alike, and over time states have 
modified their involuntary annexation provisions to reflect shifting 
public sentiment toward municipal-boundary expansion. 
Involuntary annexation provisions are largely defined by the 
absence of a requirement that the local resident, voter, or property 
owner consent to the enactment of a proposed annexation.�' T hey 
effectively provide municipalities a unilateral or near-unilateral ability 
to extend their boundaries to encompass unincorporated territory. 
While controversial, involuntary annexation is likely a small fraction of 
the total annexation activity occurring in states with involuntary 
annexation provisions. Only one study has analyzed the frequency of 
annexation activity by method of annexation. 22 That study found that 
roughly 9% of annexations conducted in North Carolina between 1 990 
and 2009 were involuntary annexations.23 
States that incorporate some meaningful version of a unilateral 
municipal-determination feature fall within the Article's definition of 
an "involuntary annexation state." Arguably any qualification on 
unilateral power calls into question its unilateral nature, but Indiana, 
Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas 
have managed to maintain fairly broad and permissive involuntary 
annexation provisions. 24 Qualifications on that power include 
significant preconditions and requirements that must be satisfied 
before a municipality can exercise its involuntary annexation powers or 
include opportunities for a popular veto of involuntary annexations 
after they take effect. These provisions are designed in a variety of 
20. See infra Part IL 
21. Most states require a threshold of consent by residents, property owners, or both 
as a condition of effecting a valid annexation. This can take the form of a petition or a 
referendum vote. These requirements are explicit in statutory design and their presence 
makes it impossible to unilaterally extend municipal boundaries. See, e.g., LA. R.Ev. STAT. 
§ 33: l 72(A)(l )(a) (2012) ("No ordinance enlarging the boundaries of a municipality shall be 
valid unless, prior to the adoption thereof, a petition has been presented to the governing body 
of a municipality containing the written assent of a majority of the registered voters and a 
majority in number of the resident property owners as well as twenty-five percent in value of 
the property of the resident property owners within the area proposed to be included in the 
corporate limits, all according to the certificates of the parish assessor and parish registrar of 
voters."). 
22. SeeSmith, supra note 7, at 166-67. 
23. See1datl70tbl.l . 
24. As of the conclusion of North Carolina's 2012 legislative session, the state no 
longer has an involuntary annexation regime. The pioneering design and effectiveness of 
North Carolina's involuntary annexation provisions (despite those provisions' relatively recent 
repeal) warrant the state's inclusion in this article's classification of involuntary annexation 
states. See infta Part II.E. 
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ways, and each construction reflects the state's conception of the role 
of boundary formation and management in shaping its local 
communities. 
Some important caveats are in order. Local government 
boundary policy varies considerably in each of the fifty states. The 
following is not meant to be an exhaustive summary of all approaches 
to annexation, but rather a description of those regimes that best 
resemble what this Article considers to confer unilateral or near­
unilateral rights over boundary expansion to local governments. 
Additionally, and as the footnotes make clear, annexation is closely 
related to municipal incorporation law, which is not the focus of this 
Article and, therefore, is not directly addressed. 
A. Indiana 
Indiana's annexation statute does not allow expressly for 
involuntary or unilateral annexation. It does allow municipalities to 
extend their boundaries by ordinance, however. "Generally, the 
annexation process formally begins when a municipality adopts an 
ordinance annexing territory . . . . "25 "However, . . . the annexation 
process can begin when an individual files a petition with a 
municipality requesting that the municipality annex his or her property 
• •
• •  
"26 If by ordinance, a municipality may adopt it only after its 
legislative body has held a public hearing concerning the proposed 
annexation. 21 
The statute provides that individuals attending the hearing must 
have the opportunity to testify and that notice of the hearing must be 
sent to each property owner in the area proposed for annexation and to 
the owners of property adjacent to public rights of way included in the 
area to be annexed.28 It is possible, however, that the ordinance can be 
passed against the opposition of property owners in an area proposed 
for annexation.29 This possibility essentially gives the municipality the 
opportunity to involuntarily annex new territory. 
25. City of Carmel v. Steele, 836 N.E.2d 967, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing IND. 
CoDE §§ 36-4-3-3 to -4). 
26. Id at 972-73; see IND. CODE§ 36-4-3-5(a) (2012). . . 
27. See IND. CODE § 36-4-3-2.l(a) ("The municipality shall hold the public heanng 
not earlier than sixty (60) days after the date the ordinance is introduced. All interested 
parties must have the opportunity to testify as to the proposed annexation."). 
28. See id §§ 36-4-3-2.1 to -2.2, 36-4-3-3. 
29. Seeid 
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Under the ordinance option, municipalities must meet certain 
threshold conditions. The first is contiguity. 30 Under Indiana's statute, 
"territory sought to be annexed may be considered 'contiguous' only if 
at least one-eighth ( 118) of the aggregate external boundaries of the 
territory coincides with the boundaries of the annexing municipality."3' 
Additionally, the municipality must adopt a fiscal plan prior to giving 
notice of the proposed annexation to the affected property owners.12 
The fiscal plan must show "[t]he cost estimates of planned services to 
be furnished to the territory to be annexed[,] itemized estimated costs 
for each municipal department or agency[, t]he method or methods of 
financing the planned services[,] how specific and detailed expenses 
will be funded[, and t]he plan for the organization and extension of 
services."13 
Indiana's implicit involuntary approach includes a the property 
owner "check" on involuntary annexation that is triggered once the 
annexation is complete. Once an annexation ordinance has been 
adopted and published, the affected property owners have ninety days 
to file a remonstrance.34 The remonstrance must include the signatures 
of "(A) at least sixty-five percent (65%) of the owners of land in the 
annexed territory; or (B) the owners of more than seventy-five percent 
(75%) in assessed valuation of the land in the annexed territory."35 If 
property owners in the newly annexed area take such action, Indiana's 
statute specifically provides guidelines for judicial review of the 
municipality's annexation decision.36 
In its 2011 legislative session, Indiana's lawmakers considered 
Senate Bill 0069, which would have required that an annexing town or 
city submit a petition to the court with the approval of at least 60% of 
the property owners in an area proposed for annexation, effectively 
eliminating the involuntary annexation option.37 The legislation also 
considered another petition option for municipalities, permitting them 
to submit owner signatures from more than 7 5% of the annexed land's 
30. See id § 36-4-3-3(a). 
3 1 .  Id § 36-4-3- 1 .5 .  Indiana courts have interpreted contiguity to mean that "the 
territory or some part of the territory in which [a municipality] seeks to annex must be 
contiguous at such time prior to the annexation ordinance and not made contiguous 
contemporaneously by the language of such annexation ordinance." Steele, 836 N.E.2d at 
972. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36.  
37. 
See IND. CODE§ 36-4-3-3. l (b). 
See1d § 36-4-3-1 3 (d)(I) to - 1 3(d)(3). 
See id§ 36-4-3-l (a). 
See id§ 36-4-3 - 1  l (a). 
See id § 36-4-3-13. 
See S.B. 69, I 17th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 201 1  ). 
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assessed value. The proposed legislation would have allowed 
municipalities to annex noncontiguous territories to build an industrial 
park, shopping center, or economic development project in the area.38 
The legislation did not pass, but it signals the existence of forces 
within the state that seek to curtail the involuntary annexation power 
currently afforded to municipalities. 
Indiana's backlash to involuntary annexation is seen in citizens' 
movements such as the Citizens for Center Grove.39 The organization 
is working toward the incorporation of the Center Grove area as a 
defense mechanism to their possible annexation. It has also expressed 
concerns about the impact of involuntary annexation in the state. The 
organization's Web site discusses the impact of incorporation and 
annexation from the aspect of the impact of municipal ser vice delivery 
on property values. W hile the Web site's literature expresses 
understandable concerns about service delivery, it also reflects 
concerns about the community's tax dollars being spent beyond its 
self-defined community.40 
B Kansas 
Involuntary annexation in Kansas is initiated by a municipality's 
adoption of a resolution stating its intent to annex land into its 
borders.41 After the adoption of the resolution, notice of the proposed 
annexation and of a public hearing to address the proposed annexation 
is published in the official newspaper as well as sent by certified mail 
to each property owner in the area of proposed annexation.42 At the 
public hearing, a city representative shall present the annexation 
proposal, and members of the public are given the opportunity to 
comment.43 
Kansas's annexation statute allows the governing body of any city 
to annex land by ordinance if any one of seven conditions exists: 
(1) The land is platted, and some part of the land adjoins the city. 
(2) The land is owned by or held in trust for the city or any agency 
thereof. 
38. See id 
39. See CITIZENS FOR CENTER GROVE, http://www.citizensforcentergrove.org/ (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
40. See id 
41. See KAN. STAT.§ 12-520a (2012). 
42. See id§ 12-520a(c). 
43. See id§ 12-520a(e). 
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(3) The land adjoins the city and is owned by or held in trust for any 
governmental unit other than another city, except that no city may 
annex land owned by a county ... without the express permission 
of the board of county commissioners of the county. 
(4) The land lies within or mainly within the city and has a common 
perimeter with the city boundary line of more than 50%. 
( 5) The land if annexed will make the city boundary line straight or 
harmonious and some part thereof adjoins the city, except no land 
in excess of 21 acres shall be annexed for this purpose. 
(6) The tract is so situated that 2/3 of any boundary line adjoins the 
city, except no tract in excess of 21 acres shall be annexed under 
this condition. 
(7) The land adjoins the city and a written petition for or consent to 
annexation is filed with the city by the owner.44 
Only the seventh condition facilitates a "consent" annexation.45 
The other conditions essentially permit an involuntary annexation 
through the passage of an ordinance by a city. While most of the 
provisions place specific restraints on what lands are available for 
annexation, the first condition simply requires that the land is platted 
and some part of it adjoins the city. This relatively low bar enables a 
municipality to annex land in an involuntary manner. Property owners 
can weigh in on an annexation through the public hearing process, but 
it is conceivable that a municipality could proceed with an annexation 
over the objections of property owners. 
Under the Kansas statute, the city is directed to consider sixteen 
factors in determining the advisability of the involuntary annexation, 
which include: 
(3) [the] topography, natural boundaries, ... transportation links or 
any other physical characteristics which may be an indication of 
the existence or absence of common interest of the city and the 
area proposed to be annexed; 
(4) [the] extent and age of residential development in the area to be 
annexed and adjacent land within the city's boundaries; 
(5) [the] present population in the area to be annexed and the 
projected population growth during the next five years in the area 
proposed to be annexed; 
(6) [the] extent of business, commercial and industrial development 
in the area; 
44. Id § 12-520(a). 
45. See id § 12-520(a)(7); see also In re Petition of Overland Park for Annexation of 
Land, 736 P2d 923, 925 (Kan. 1987) (describing the general application of Kansas' 
annexation statute). 
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(9) [the] tax impact upon property in the city and the area; 
(10) [the] extent to which the residents of the area are directly or 
indirectly dependent upon the city for governmental services and 
for social, economic, employment, cultural and recreational 
opportunities and resources; 
(12) existing petitions for incorporation of the area as a new city or for 
the creation of a special district; 
(13) [the] likelihood of significant growth in the area and in adjacent 
areas during the next five years; 
(15) (the] economic impact on the area; and 
(16) (the] wasteful duplication of services 46 
If the municipality can satisfy these conditions, it can proceed 
with the unilateral annexation of neighboring territory. Kansas 's 
annexation statutes explicitly prescribe a very narrow scope of judicial 
review, providing that the wisdom, necessity, or advisability of an 
annexation is not a matter for consideration by the courts and that the 
courts' role is limited to determining whether cities possess the 
statutory authority to annex land and whether they have acted 
accordingly under that authority.47 
While the statutory design of involuntary annexation is typically 
more avowed, conscious, and deliberate, Kansas 's approach is more 
tacit and incidental. The opportunity for property owners and citizens 
to be heard at a public hearing prior to the enactment of an annexation 
ordinance and the sixteen statutory conditions for determining the 
advisability of an annexation are evidence of considerable 
opportunities for public sanction of a proposed involuntary annexation 
as well as meaningful public participation throughout the process. 
While property owner and citizen input is facilitated and seemingly 
encouraged throughout the annexation process, it is not required. 
C. Kentucky 
In Kentucky, the limitations imposed on a municipality's 
annexation authority are tied to the municipality's classification. The 
state statute assigns every city a classification ranging from First Class, 
which only contains the state's largest city, Louisville, to Sixth Class, 
46. See KAN. STAT.§ 12-520a(e). 
47. See, e.g., Cedar Creek Props., Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 815 P.2d 492, 495 
(Kan.1991). 
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which includes every city not listed.48 The First Class consists of cities 
that have, in effect, a compact with the county.49 Cities within the 
Second and Third Classes are granted authority to annex 
unincorporated territory, with the caveat that the annexation can be 
denied if a petition in opposition is filed in a timely manner.50 
Louisville, the only city within the First Class, can only annex 
territory subject to the consent of the voters in the area proposed for 
annexation.51 Other cities can annex territory by ordinance, but are 
subject to rejection by a petition representing at least 50% of the 
resident voters or owners of real property in the area to be annexed.52 
To annex unincorporated territory, the legislative body of cities, 
other than those within the First Class, must enact an ordinance stating 
their intent to annex. 53 If the petition is successful, voters in the area to 
be annexed will be able to vote on the question of annexation.54 The 
annexation will be rejected if at least 55% of those persons voting 
oppose the annexation. 55 In the instance that an annexation is rejected, 
the city must wait five years before it may attempt to annex the same 
area or resubmit the question of annexation.56 
Kentucky's statute is structured like a consent statute, but unlike 
the most common consent statutes, property owner or resident 
approval is not required to initiate the process. The possibility that an 
ordinance stating the intent to annex could withstand a resident or 
voter petition against it (one that fails to gain a majority of support) 
and become law gives it the quality of an involuntary annexation. The 
petition requirement is effectively a remonstrance, provided it clears 
the 50% threshold. While this is a weak form of involuntary 
annexation statute, it is worth mentioning nonetheless. 
D. Nebraska 
Nebraska's approach to involuntary annexation is the most 
straightforward example of a scheme built around leveraging 
48.  See KY. REV. STAT. § 8 1 .0 1 0  (2012). 
49. See id § 81A.005. 
50 .  See 1d § 81A.420. 
5 1 .  See 1d § 8 1A.005(a). 
52.  See 1d § 81A.420(2). 
53 .  See 1d § 81A.420(1) ;  see also Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov't v. City of 
Pr?s�ect, 277 S.':"- 3d 227, 228 (Ky. 2009) (holding that the larger city of Louisville had 
pnonty over the city of Prospect because it introduced an ordinance of annexation). 
54. See KY. REV. STAT. § 8 1A.420(2). 
5 5 .  See id § 8 IA.420(2)(c). 
56 .  See id § 8J A.460. 
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metropolitan economies of scale and promoting the continued growth 
of the largest municipalities and, in turn, the largest metropolitan 
regions in the state . In Nebraska, involuntary annexation is 
conditioned upon city size and, like Kentucky, a classification system. 
Municipalities are classified as Metropolitan Class (containing a 
population greater than 300,000),57 Primary Class (containing a 
population greater than 100,000 but less than 300,000),58 First Class 
(containing a population greater than 5000 but less than 1 00,000),59 
Second Class (containing a population greater than 800 but less than 
5000),60 or Village (containing a population of greater than 1 00 but less 
than 800).61 Municipalities in all classifications are granted 
involuntary annexation powers, but only with regard to cities of a 
lesser class. 
Metropolitan Class cities can extend their boundaries over 
contiguous or adjacent land that includes or annexes a city of the First 
Class with populations of less than I 0,000, any adjoining city of the 
Second Class, or a Village.6� Primary Class cities can involuntarily 
annex Villages.63 First Class cities must adopt a specified annexation 
resolution and plan for the extension of services before annexing 
land.'"' Metropolitan Class cities, on the other hand, can extend their 
boundaries at any time by ordinance.65 Nebraska's state constitution 
provides that the merger or consolidation of municipalities or counties 
requires the approval of a maj ority of people voting in each 
municipality or county to be merged or consolidated but explicitly 
exempts annexations from such a requirement.66 
With regard to annexation by cities of the Metropolitan Class, 
Nebraska's statute provides: 
The corporate limits of any c ity of the metropolitan class shall be 
fixed and determined by ordinance by the council of such city. The city 
council of any city of the metropolitan class may at any time extend the 
corporate limits of such city over any contiguous or adjacent lands, lo�s, 
tracts. streets. or highways. such distance as may be deemed proper m 
57. S(.'t.' NEH. RF\". STAI. * 1 4- 1 0 1  (20 1 2 ). 
58. Sct'id * 1 5- 1 0  I .  
59. S<.'C: id * 1 6- 1 0 1 .  
60. Sc.'t· id * 1 7- 1  () I .  
6 1 .  .S<.'t· 1d * 1 7-3 1 2( 1 l. OO?) ( · · 62. .S<.'t· City of Elkhorn \ .  City of Omaha, 725 N.W2d 792, 808 (Neb. 2 c1tmg 
\1.R. RF.\. STAT. * 1 4- 1 1 7 ) .  
63. Sc.'t· �l·.B. RI'\: ST-\T. � 1 5 - 1 1 7 . 
64. Sec Elkhorn. 725 :\.\\".2d at 799. 
65. .X'(' �rn. Rt.\. ST.\T � 1 4 - 1 1 7. 
66. .xx· Flkhnm. 25 :-.;.\\.· 2d at !1 1 0  ( citing NEB. CONST. art. xv; §  1 8(2)). 
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any direction, and may include, annex, merge, or consolidate with such 
city of the metropolitan class, by such extension of its limits, any 
adjoining city of the first class having less than ten thousand population 
or any adjoining city of the second class or village. Any other laws and 
limitations defining the boundaries of cities or villages or the increase 
of area or extension of limits thereof shall not apply to lots, lands, cities, 
or villages annexed, consolidated, or merged under this section.67 
Nebraska's annexation statute essentially allows its largest cities to 
conswne smaller cities lying in their paths of expansion without having 
to obtain the consent of the residents within those smaller cities. 
Cities smaller than those in the Metropolitan Class have the same 
right to involuntarily annex, but those rights are limited according to 
certain threshold requirements. For cities in the Primary Class, the city 
council may annex, by ordinance, any contiguous or adjacent lands 
that ( 1 )  are within the city's limits and that (2) the city serves with 
water service, sanitary sewerage, or both.68 For cities of the First Class, 
the requirements are even more specific. The mayor and the city 
council must both consent to the annexation ordinance, and they may 
annex any adjacent or contiguous lands that are urban or suburban in 
character, but not any agricultural lands.69 Cities of the First Class are 
also subject to certain procedural requirements, such as developing a 
plan for the extension of city services to the area to be annexed and 
holding a public hearing.10 
Nebraska's annexation regime effectively allows every class of 
city the opportunity to extend its borders without the consent of those 
in the areas to be annexed. This policy was challenged by Citizens for 
a Free Nebraska, a statewide movement of citizens organized against 
forced annexation.11 The organization, which was dissolved in 
November of 201 0, sought to enact a law that would prevent the 
annexation of a city without the majority vote from the residents in the 
area to be annexed. 72 They also sought to enact a law that would allow 
annexed cities to deannex themselves by a vote of the residents in the 
annexed area within five years of the annexation.73 The group 
67. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 14- 1 1 7. 
68. See id § 1 5- 104. 
69. See id § 16-1 17(1). 
70. See id § 16-1 17(3)-(5). 
7 1 .  See Statewide Implications, CITIZENS FOR A FREE NEB., http://www.freenebraska. 
net/statewideimplications.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
72. See id; Ballot Question Committees, NEB. ACCOUNTABILITY & DISCLOSURE 
CoMM'N, http://nadc.nol.org/cf/ballot_question_committees.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
73. See Ballot Question Committees, supra note 72. 
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characterized involuntary annexation as a taking and established the 
movement to override the state's involuntary annexation provisions as 
related to principles of fairness, democracy, and representation.74 
E North Carolina 
North Carolina no longer has involuntary annexation, but up until 
the state's 2012  legislative session, North Carolina was the blueprint 
for involuntary annexation. For more than forty years, North Carolina 
has had one of the nation's most comprehensive state land use policies. 
North Carolina's annexation laws have been hailed as a model urban 
policy that has been essential to the growth and economic development 
of the state's metropolitan regions during the second half of the 
twentieth century.75 Annexation in North Carolina stretches back to the 
formation of the state 's Municipal Government Study Commission in 
1958, which was convened by the state's leading municipalities 
following calls for a new statewide land use policy.16 Its most 
progressive feature had been its very permissive involuntary 
annexation provisions. 
In the past several years, North Carolinians have been engaged in 
a fight over involuntary annexation. The saga produced legislative 
developments and litigation that culminated during the state's 201 2  
legislative session. The original statute incorporated broad provisions 
for involuntary annexation. Any municipality with a population of 
over 5000 could annex territory unilaterally.11 The statutory provisions 
took into consideration the impact of boundary expansion on affected 
property owners and exhibited considerable regard for their freedom of 
location choice by building into the statute a number of constraints on 
the ability of municipalities to extend their boundaries unilaterally.:• 
7 4. See Statewide Implications, supra note 7 1 .  
75. See generally Elizabeth R. Connolly, Bargain Basement Annexation: How 
Municipalities Subvert the Intent of North Carolina Annexation Laws, 29 N.C. CENT. L.J. 77 
(2006) (discussing the inequalities that were inherent in North Carolina's involuntary 
annexation Jaws); Rob Christensen, Many HBJJ North Carolina Annexation Law, NEWS & 
OBSERVER, http://www.newsobserver.com/201 1103/27 / 1085023/many-hail-NCS-annexation­
law.html (last modified Mar. 27, 201 1, 09: 1 8  AM) (attributing the growth and economic 
health of many North Carolina cities to the state's annexation Jaws). For instance, between 
1960 and 20 1 0, Raleigh, North Carolina, saw its population more than triple. Neighboring 
state capitals, however, did not see similar growth. Columbia, South Carolina, had a slight 
population increase, while Richmond, Virginia, shrank. See id 
76. See Connolly, supra note 75, at 8 1  (discussing the history of the Municipal 
Government Study Commission). 
77. SeeN.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-46 (20 10) (repealed 201 1 ). 
78. See id § 160A-47 (repealed 2 0 1 1 ) .  
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The original statute provided strict geographical and developmental 
criteria and procedures for involuntary annexation.19 North Carolina 
courts have emphasized, "[M]unicipal services must be extended to 
newly annexed areas in a nondiscriminatory manner, meaning that 
annexed residents and property owners must receive substantially the 
same services that existing [municipal] residents and property owners 
receive."80 
In 201 1 ,  the state legislature passed An Act To Reform the 
Involuntary Annexation Laws of North Carolina, which brought about 
several changes to the annexation process.8 1  First, the legislation 
required that a municipality annexing under the involuntary annexation 
provisions wait one year after filing a Resolution of Consideration 
identifying the area under consideration for annexation before it could 
adopt a Resolution of Intent to proceed with the annexation.82 Second, 
the legislation introduced a Petition to Deny Annexation Ordinance 
provision whereby eligible property owners opposing the annexation 
would have 1 3 0  days from the date that the annexation ordinance 
would be adopted to sign and obtain signatures representing 60% of 
the property owners in the affected area.83 Upon timely delivery of the 
petition to the municipal governing board, the annexation would be 
terminated and the municipality would be prohibited from adopting 
another annexation ordinance for the same area for at least three 
years.84 
The changes enacted by the 20 1 1 legislation essentially allowed a 
majority of property owners in an annexed area to veto an involuntary 
annexation. The portion of the 20 1 1  legislation establishing the 
Petition to Deny Annexation Ordinance process was ultimately struck 
down as unconstitutional because it allowed only landowners to 
participate in the petition as opposed to all voters.85 In City of 
Goldsboro v. North Carolina,86 the North Carolina Superior Court held 
that provisions providing for the Petition to Deny Annexation 
Ordinance violated the sections of the North Carolina Constitution that 
79. See Nolan v. Village of Marvin, 624 S.E.2d 305, 306 (N.C. 2006) (citing N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 1 60A-35 to -37 (repealed 201 1 )). 
80. Id (citing Greene v. Town ofValdese, 2 9 1  S.E.2d 630, 635 (N.C. 1982)). 
8 1 .  See H.R. 845, 20 1 1 -20 1 2  Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 20 1 1 ). 
82. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 60A-58.55(a), (c) (201 1 )  (amended 20 12). 
83.  See id § 1 60A-58.55(i)(8), ( 1 1 )  (amended 2012). 
84. See id§ 1 60A-58.55(i)( l 1) (amended 20 1 2). 
85.  City of Goldsboro v. State, Nos. 1 1 -CVS- 1 8288 & l l -CVS- 1 8230, slip op. at 2 
(N.C. Super. Ct. Mar. 27, 2012); 20 1 2  VIL 1440446. 
86. See id 
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provide that political rights are not dependent on property,81 equal 
protection of the laws,88 the ban on exclusive privilegeS,89 and the 
statute's prohibition on the incorporation of a municipality within one 
mile of the corporate limits of a municipality having a population of 
5000 or more.90 
In the 20 12 legislative session, involuntary annexation suffered a 
deathblow. North Carolina House Bill 925 was emolled May 30, 
2012.91 The legislation proposed changing the annexation process to a 
referendum vote (during a municipal election) of those residing in the 
annexation area. Only registered voters of the proposed annexation 
area would be allowed to vote on the referendum. A simple majority 
of all registered voters who actually voted in the referendum would be 
able to kill any proposed annexation. If the proposed annexation was 
denied, that proposed annexation area could not be annexed for at least 
three years from the date of the referendum.92 North Caro lina 
Governor Beverly Purdue committed to neither signing nor vetoing the 
bill, stating that while she "recognize[d] the need for some changes in 
the annexation process, . . .  reform should neither stifle the natural 
growth-nor limit the role--of local govermnents.'m In the absence of 
a ratification or veto, the bill automatically became law.94 
The 201 2  legislative session also produced North Carolina House 
Bill 5, which was ratified on May 3 0, 20 1 2.95 The legislation targeted 
specific communities for deannexation. House Bill 5 deannexed legal .  
pending, or completed annexations in Asheville, Fayettevi l le. 
Goldsboro, Kinston, Lexington, Marvin, Rocky Mountain, Southport. 
and Wilmington.96 House Bill 5 also contained a provision that 
imposed a twelve-year prohibition on any annexation attempt of the 
enumerated areas.91 
87. See N.C. CONST. art. I, § 1 1 . 
88. See id art. I, § 1 9 .  
89. See id art. I, § 32. 
90. See 1d art. VII, § 1 .  
9 1 .  See H.R. 925, 201 1 -20 12 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 201 2). 
92. Id 
93. Gary D. Robertson, Associated Press, NC Governor Won 't Block Forced 
Annexation Changes, CTPOST.COM (June 1 1 , 2012, 5:45 PM), http://webcache.googleuser 
content.com/search?q=cache:6K9n3dDdPH4J:www.ctpost.com/news/article/NC-govemor­
�on-t-block-forced-annexation-changes-3623 1 82 .  php+&cd= I &hl=en&ct=clnk&g I =us 
(mtemal quotation marks omitted) (accessed through Google by viewing the cached version ). 
94. See id 
95. See H.R. 5, 20 1 1 -2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 201 2). 
96. See id. 
97. See id 
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House Bill 5 and the other pieces of legislation are the result of 
actions by citizens' groups like the Biltmore Lake Community Action 
Committee and the residents of The Gates Four community near 
Fayetteville, North Carolina.98 These groups and others have 
channeled their strong opposition to involuntary annexation into local 
and state politics. They have also pursued litigation. Over the past 
fifteen years, at least seven cases involving disputes over involuntary 
annexation proceeclings have been litigated in North Carolina courts.99 
Their focus on involuntary annexation, however, is arguably 
disproportionate to the extent to which such annexations actually 
occur. As previously mentioned, of the more than 14,000 annexations 
conducted in North Carolina between 1990 and 2009, only 132 1 ,  or 
9%, were involuntary annexations. wo 
F. Tennessee 
Involuntary annexation in Tennessee is part of a broad and 
comprehensive statewide land use policy focused on encouraging 
governance uniformity across a metropolitan region.101 Tennessee 
municipalities may unilaterally annex adjoining territory by ordinance 
when doing so will advance the state's concern for the growth, 
development, public safety, and welfare of its metropolitan regions.102 
If a municipality has a population greater than 10,000, its ability to 
annex new territory unilaterally is limited to within a two-year time 
frame.103 Tennessee's annexation statute provides, in relevant part, that 
an annexation will be deemed necessary under two conditions: when a 
98. For a more in-depth discussion of the efforts of these groups and others, see 
Tyson, supra note 2. 
99. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Asheville, 597 S.E.2d 717 (N.C. 
2004); Hall v. City of Asheville, 2008 N.C. App. LEXIS 1605 (N.C. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2008); 
Brown v. City of Winston-Salem, 626 S.E.2d 747 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006); Arnold v. City of 
Asheville, 6 1 0  S.E.2d 280 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); Briggs v. City of Asheville, 583 S.E.2d 733 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2003); Ridgefield Props., L.L.C. v. City of Asheville, 583 S.E.2d 400 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2003); Asheville Indus. ,  Inc. v. City of Asheville, 436 S.E.2d 873 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1 993). 
1 00. See Smith, supra note 7,  at 1 70 tbl . 1 .  
1 0 1 .  TENN. CODE § 6-58- 102 (20 1 2) ("With this chapter, the general assembly intends 
to establish a comprehensive growth policy for this state that: ( 1 )  Eliminates annexation or 
incorporation out of fear; (2) Establishes incentives to annex or incorporate where 
appropriate; (3) More closely matches the timing of development and the provision of public 
services; (4) Stabilizes each county's education funding base and establishes an incentive for 
each county legislative body to be more interested in education matters; and (5) Minimizes 
urban sprawl."). 
1 02 .  See id § 6-5 1- 102. 
1 03 .  Id § 6-5 1 - 102(a)(3)(A). 
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majority of residents and property owners in the affected area present a 
petition or when it appears the "prosperity of such municipality and 
territory will be materially retarded" without the annexation. 104 This 
approach explicitly provides for both property owner petitions and 
municipality determinations on the need for annexation. 
Tennessee 's current annexation statute is the result of the 
invalidation of a 1 997 annexation law that made it easier for small 
towns located in the fringe areas of adjacent cities to incorporate 
themselves rather than be annexed by the metropolitan region's central 
city. 105 The 1 997 law was struck down by the Tennessee Supreme 
Court in Tennessee Munidpal League v. Thompson, 106 after which the 
state legislature created a committee to rewrite the state's annexation 
law. 107 The revised annexation law resulted in a broader 
Comprehensive Growth Plan, whose purpose is "to direct the 
coordinated, efficient, and orderly development of the local 
government and its environs that will, based on an analysis  of present 
and future needs, best promote the public health, safety, morals and 
general welfare."108 
Tennessee's annexation statute favors the growth of its largest 
municipalities by affording them priority in annexation contests. 
Where two municipalities incorporated in the same county seek to 
annex the same territory, "the proceedings of the municipality having 
the larger population shall have precedence and the smaller 
municipality's proceedings shall be held in abeyance pending the 
outcome of the proceedings of the larger municipality."109 
The Comprehensive Growth Plan directs each city and county to 
determine an urban growth boundary to guide its development. 1 1 0 
Under the Comprehensive Growth Plan, "A municipality possesses 
104. Id 
1 05. See 1 997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1 65; Tenn. Mun. League v. Thompson, 958 S.W.2d 333, 
334-35 (Tenn. 1997) (discussing the background and construction of the annexation statute); 
Michael J. Stewart, Growth and !ts Implications: An Evaluation of Tennessee's Growth 
Management Pla11, 67 TENN. L. REv. 983, 987 (2000) (discussing the origins of Tennessee's 
Comprehensive Growth Plan and its relation to the state's annexation statute). 
106. 958 S.W2d at 338. 
1 07. Among other things, the 1997 annexation law significantly lowered the 
population requirement for the incorporation of a municipality, deleted prohibitions on the 
incorporation of new municipalities within certain distances of existing municipalities of a 
certain population, allowed a letter from a single resident to be used in lieu o f  a petition to 
incorporate a new municipality, and did not require a plan for municipal services or a five­
year budget. See 1 997 Tenn. Pub. Acts 165; Thompson, 958 S.W.2d at 334-35 .  
1 08. TENN. CODE § 6-58-1 07. 
1 09. Id § 6-5 1 - 1 1 0. 
1 1 0. See id § 6-58-1 04(a)(2). 
3 1 8 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 87 :297 
exclusive authority to annex territory located within its approved urban 
growth boundaries; therefore, no municipality may annex by ordinance 
or by referendum any territory located within another municipality's 
approved urban growth boundaries ."1 1 1  The combined effect of 
Tennessee's annexation statute and its Comprehensive Growth Plan is 
to incentivize urban growth planning by tying a municipality's 
annexation powers to the development of its growth plan. 1 1 2 In addition 
to incentivizing planning, this approach also puts communities on 
notice that boundary expansion is possible and thereby manages 
expectations about the limits of property owners' autonomy over 
choosing their municipal identity. This reflects the Comprehensive 
Growth Plan's aim to eliminate annexation or incorporation based on 
fear. 1 13 
G Texas 
The unilateral authority to annex territory in Texas traces back to 
19 13  legislation, which implemented the 1 9 12  Home Rule 
Amendment to the Texas Constitution, and gave home rule cities the 
ability to annex adjacent territory. 1 14 Annexation legislation was 
infrequent until the enactment of the Municipal Annexation Act of 
1 963, which set forth the procedures for annexation, established the 
concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ),1 1 5  and granted cities the 
unilateral authority to annex areas within their ETJs. 1 1 6  ETJ is defined 
as the area of land extending beyond the city limits over which the city 
maintains some control. 1 1 1  When a city annexes additional areas, its 
ETJ is  also extended.118 A city's annexation authority is limited to the 
area within its ETJ. 1 19 
111 .  Id § 6-58-11 l (a). 
112 . See id ("Within a municipality's approved urban growth boundaries, a munici­
pality may use any of the methods in chapter 51 [the annexation statute J of this title to annex 
territory; provided, that if a quo warranto action i s  filed to challenge the annexation, the party 
filing the action has the burden of proving that: (1) An annexation ordinance is unreasonable 
for the overall well-being of the communities involved; or (2) The health, safety, and welfare 
of the citizens and property owners of the municipality and territory will not be materially 
retarded in the absence of such annexation."). 
113 . Id § 6-58-102(1). 
114 . See 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307- 1 0. 
115 . See TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE §§  42.001, .021 (2011). 
1 16 .  See Our History, PLANNING & DEV. DEP'T, CITY OF Haus., http://www.houstontx. 
gov/planning/AboutPD/pd_history.htrnl (last visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
117. See TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 42.001 . 
118. Id § 42 .022. 
119 . Seejd § 43.051. 
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Although all Texas municipalities are granted the authority to 
annex territory unilaterally, "general law" municipalities may only 
unilaterally annex under very limited circumstances.120 Home rule 
municipalities, which usually have a population over 5000,121 may do 
anything permitted by their charter. 122 Most home rule charters 
authorize involuntary annexation. Unless the home rule municipality 
owns the area to be annexed, the municipality may only annex territory 
that lies within its ETJ. 123 
In general, a municipality is permitted to annex a total area 
equivalent to 10% of its incorporated area in one year. 124 Any unused 
portion of that allocation may be carried over for use in the following 
years.125 However, a municipality carrying over an allocation cannot 
annex a total area more than the equivalent to 30% of its incorporated 
c h J?6 area 1or t at year. -
Notwithstanding a few exemptions, 1 21 every municipality must 
prepare an annexation plan identifying the annexations that may 
occur. 128 Any annexation plan must be maintained on the 
municipality's Web site. 1 29 Once the annexation plan is adopted, there 
is a three-year waiting period before it may be carried out. 130 During 
this waiting period, a city may amend its annexation plan to remove 
territory. If an area is removed from the annexation plan within 
eighteen months of being placed on the plan, there is a one-year 
waiting period before the area may be re-added to the annexation 
plan.131 If the area is removed from the annexation plan eighteen 
months or later from the date it was added, there is a two-year waiting 
period before the area may be re-added to the annexation plan. L'� 
Within ninety days of the adoption or amendment of a 
municipality's annexation plan, the municipality must give written 
notice to property owners in the affected area, certain public and 
private entities that service the affected area, and certain railroad 
120. See id § 43.033. 
121 .  See TEX. CONST. art. XI,§ 5; TEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE§ 5.004. 
122. SeeTEX. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 43.021. 
123. See id § 43.05 1 .  
124. See id § 43 .055(a). 
125. See id § 43.055(b). 
126. See id § 43.055(c). 
127. See id § 43.052(h). 
128. See id § 43.052(c). 
129. See id § 43.052(j). 
1 30. See id § 43.052(c). 
1 3 1 .  See id§ 43.052(e). 
132. See id 
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companies. 133 Any territory contained in the annexation plan must be 
annexed within thirty-one days after the expiration of the three-year 
waiting period. 134 Otherwise, the city will be prohibited from annexing 
the territory for five years. 135 Other procedural requirements include 
the preparation of an inventory of services and facilities in the territory 
proposed for annexation.136 Two public hearings must be held within 
ninety days after the inventory of services and facilities has been 
prepared. 137 In addition, the municipality must complete a service plan 
for the provision of municipal services to the area to be annexed. 138 
While North Carolina only recently experienced sweeping 
legislative changes that fundamentally altered the opportunity for 
involuntary annexation, Texas weathered the same backlash more than 
ten years ago. Houston's annexation of the Kingwood community 
ultimately precipitated a movement to change the state 's involuntary 
annexation provisions and a revision to the annexation regime 
altogether. The suburb of Kingwood fell within Houston's ETJ at the 
time of its proposed annexation in 1 996. 139 Houston's population at the 
time was approximately 1 .8 million.14° Kingwood's population in 1996 
was approximately 53,000, falling within the 1 0% population 
threshold established by the Municipal Annexation Act. 141 
Houston's population growth can be attributed to job creation, 
immigration, and low cost of living, 142 but its territorial expansion is 
largely attributable to involuntary annexation. 143 Houston took full 
133. See id § 43. 052(f). 
134. See id § 43.052(g). 
135. Seeid 
1 36. See id § 43.053. 
1 37 .  See1d § 43.056l(a). 
138. See Jd § 43.056. 
139. See Harris v. City of Houston (Harns I), IO F. Supp. 2d 721, 723 (S.D. Tex. 
1 997), vacated, Harris v. City of Houston (Harns II) , 151 F.3d 1 86 (5th Cir. 1998). 
140. Imad F. Abdullah, Kingwood Annexation Fight Hurts Entire Houston Area, 
Hous. Bus. J. (Nov. 24, 1996) ,  http://www.bizjoumals.com/houston/stories/1996/l l/25/ 
editorial6.html. 
141. See Renee C. Lee, Aimexed Kingwood Split on Effects, Hous. CHRON. (Oct. 8, 
2006, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/neighborhood/hwnble-news/article/Annexed-King 
wood-sp lit-on-effects- 1 868661. php. 
142. See, e.g., J.Vhen It Comes to Population Growth, Houston Is No. 1, SCI. DAILY 
(July 12, 2011 ), http:/ /www. sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/07 /1 1 0712152208 .htm. 
143. See generally Scott Houston, Municipal Annexation in Texas: "Is It Really That 
Complicated?, "TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, http://www.tml.org/legal_pdf/ANNEXATION.pdf (last 
updated Mar. 2011) (describing the operation of involuntary annexation in Texas). The 
Houston metropolitan area is the fourth largest in the nation behind New York, Los Angeles, 
and Chicago. Unlike those cities, however, Houston is largely a late-twentieth-century city 
whose identity and territory have increased substantially over a relatively short period of time. 
Houston is the result of a number of forces, developments, and phenomena in late-twentieth-
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advantage of this authority by aggressively annexing areas within its 
ETJ.144 In August of 1 996, Houston's then-Mayor Bob Lanier proposed 
that the city of Kingwood be annexed into Houston's city limits in 
order to generate annual revenues for Houston of approximately $4 
million.145 The timing of Lanier's proposal was intentional because he 
feared state lawmakers might strip cities of their annexation powers 
during the January legislative session. Furthermore, annexing 
Kingwood in December would allow Houston to collect taxes from 
Kingwood residents for the entire year in 1 997 . 1 46 
Houston's attempt to annex Kingwood was met with considerable 
resistance by Kingwood, which argued that its annexation would result 
in increased taxation and a decrease in the quality of municipal 
services.141 Some residents of Houston countered that Houston's 
strength laid in its collective, regionalized effort to attract business. In 
an article reflecting the attitudes of those supporting the proposed 
Kingwood annexation, Imad Abdullah asserted: 
If each community is allowed to shelter itself, we will have a war of 
enclaves, lobbying and stifling Houston's growth to divert it elsewhere. 
Newly formed municipalities will begin to develop their own city halls, 
their own convention centers and facilities. And sooner or later outlying 
communities will compete with Houston for convention business. 
Negative advertising will appear, contrasting the 'Livable Forest' with 
the 'Home of the Homeless' downtown Houston, with unhealthy 
consequences for all parties.148 
century American life. It is a global hub for the energy sector and is home to many of the 
nation's natural resources service companies. It benefits from Texas's relatively business­
friendly tax environment and the natural environment of the Sun Belt. Its mix of employment 
opportunity and cheap housing has made it a magnet for migrant workers, young families, 
young professionals, and retirees seeking the amenities of suburban and suburbanesque 
lifestyles. The region is known for its robust and stable regional economy, its low housing 
costs, and its expanses of flat, developable land tied together by a seemingly endless stream of 
highways. For a discussion of Houston's development and significance in contemporary 
urban development, see, for example, EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: How OUR 
GREATEST INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER 45-
50 (201 1). 
144. See Economic Development· Demographics, GREATER Haus. P'sHIP, 
http://www.houston.org/economic-developmentJfacts-figures/demographics/index.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2012). 
. 
145. See Mayor Scoring Kingwood Coup, Haus. Bus . .T. (Dec. 8, 1 996), http://www. 
bizjournals.com/houston/stories/1 996/1 2/09/editorial I .html. 
146. See1d 
147. See Annexation �xation, HOUSE RESEARCH ORO. (Jan. 13,  1 997), http://www. 
hro.house.state. tx. us/focus/annex.pdf. 
148. Abdullah, supra note 140. 
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Abdullah went on to write that Kingwood owed its success to its 
proximity to Houston, not because Kingwood itself was a center of 
employment. 149 Those in favor of Kingwood's annexation also 
mentioned the need to keep Houston from becoming a "donut city."150 
Despite massive protests by Kingwood residents, on December 1 1 , 
1 996, the Houston City Council voted to annex the city of 
Kingwood. 151 The annexation took full effect the following day. 152 On 
December 23, 1 996, the city requested preclearance of the annexation 
from the United States Department of Justice pursuant to section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act of 1 965.153 
Residents of Kingwood, residents of Houston, and utility districts 
joined together as plaintiffs in a federal lawsuit against the city of 
Houston. Although the parties' claims differed, they each sought the 
same remedy: a preliminary injunction of Kingwood's annexation. 
The lawsuit was filed in October of 1 996, before the city actually 
accomplished the annexation.154 The claimants argued that the 
annexation violated constitutionally protected rights under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 1 55 Harris, a white resident of 
Kingwood, brought claims under the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
alleging that permitting the annexation to go forward before the 
January election would deprive him of his right to vote in violation of 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States 
1 49. See id. 
1 50. R.A. Dyer, K1i1gwood Flap Draws Legislators ' Interest, Hous. CHRON. (Dec. 1 2, 
1996), http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/l 996_1 383 1 55/kingwood-flap-draws­
legislators-interest.html. 
1 5 1 .  See Harns I, 1 0  F. Supp. 2d 72 1 ,  723-25 (S.D. Tex. 1 997), vacated, Hams U, 151 
F.3d 1 86 (5th Cir. 1 998). 
1 52 .  See id. 
1 53.  See id Preclearance is  a standard requirement in the annexation process for 
states falling under the purview of the Voting Rights Act. In any covered jurisdiction, section 
5 of the Act requires preclearance of any attempt to change "any voting qualification or 
prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" by either the 
United States Department of Justice (through an administrative procedure) or a three-judge 
panel of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (through a declaratory 
judgment action). See 42 U.S.C. § 1 973c (2006). Section 2 contains a general prohibition on 
voting discrimination, enforced through federal district court l itigation. See id §§ 1973-
1973a. Under section 2, any voting practice or procedure that has a discriminatory result is 
prohibited. See id § 1973. The test to determine if a voting practice or procedure has a 
discriminatory result is not whether the discriminatory effect is intentional. Rather, the test is 
whether the electoral processes are equally accessible to minority voters. See id The 
Supreme Court has interpreted the words "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting" 
to have a broad meaning. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 563-67 ( 1 969); see 
Voting Rights Act of 1965, §§ 2, 5, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1 973- 1976. 
1 54. See Hariis II, 1 5 1 F.3d at 1 88. 
1 5 5 .  See Hards I, 1 0  F. Supp. 2d at 723. 
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Constitution. 156 The United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Texas held that his rights were not violated because he had 
no right to vote in the January 1 8th election; voting changes that have 
not been cleared under section 5 have no effect until preclearance has 
been granted.157 Because he was not deemed to have been denied any 
existing right to vote, his Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment claims 
f: 'l d 158 ai e . 
The plaintiffs' section 2 claim was also denied on the basis that, 
under the totality of the circwnstances, the plaintiffs did not prove that 
the annexation diluted minorities' opportunities to participate in the 
city political process and to elect representatives of their choice as was 
enjoyed by white voters. The court further found that partisan 
affiliation, not race, was a better explanation for divergent voting 
patterns.159 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that because the plaintiffs only prayed for injunctive 
relief, and at the time of the decision the annexation had already taken 
place, the plaintiffs' argument was moot and judgment was entered in 
favor of the defendant.160 Judge Harold DeMoss dissented with respect 
to Harris' Fourteenth Amendment claim, however, and decried the 
court's decision to allow Houston to tax the Kingwood residents 
without representation.16 1 Judge DeMoss's point of view was echoed 
the following year when Senate Bill 89 was introduced during the 
1999 legislative session.162 
Senate Bill 89 was a substantial revision to the Municipal 
Annexation Act of 1 963. 163 Under the revised law, large municipalities 
are required to draft annexation plans specifically identifying 
annexations that may occur. 164 Any area proposed to be annexed is 
subject to a three-year waiting period from the time the area is 
156. See id 
157. See id at 729. 
158. See id 
159. See id at 724-25. There was substantial evidence showing an established record 
of the city's minority citizens successfully electing representatives of their choice. The court 
looked at past election results between minority and nonrninority candidates and determined 
that in one case, even if all 40,000 of Kingwood's residents of voting age voted for the 
nonminority candidate, the minority still would have won. The court went on to say, "The 
Voting Rights Act 'does not purport to guarantee or to compel minority representation in 
publicly elected bodies that is proportional to the racial makeup of the political unit.'" Id at 
727 (quoting Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 1 43, 1 53 (5th Cir. 1 985)). 
1 60. See Harris ll, 1 5 1 F.3d at 1 87.  
161 .  See id at 191  (DeMoss, J., dissenting). 
162. See id; S. 1389, 76th Leg., ! st Reg. Sess. (Tex. 1 999). 
163 .  See Houston, supra note 143, at 2 1 .  
1 64. SeeTEx. Loe. Gov'T CODE § 43.052(c) (20 1 1 ). 
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included in the municipalities' annexation plan. 1 65 Senate Bill 89 also 
mandated new requirements for notice, giving residents of 
communities at risk of being annexed a significant opportunity to be 
heard. 166 The most significant revision was the requirement that a 
service plan be implemented, giving residents of communities to be 
annexed an expectation of the quality and quantity of municipal 
services they could expect after the annexation.161 Rather than 
unilaterally deciding to annex an area within a city's ETJ, city officials 
must now initially determine whether an area they wish to annex falls 
under one of the exemptions from the annexation plan requirement.168 
The Municipal Annexation Act still affords extra protection to 
large municipalities such as Houston. The Act provides for negotiation 
for the provision of services and contracting for services in lieu of 
annexation, but only for municipalities with populations of less than 
1.6 million. 169 Thus, even if  the 1999 revisions had been in effect when 
Kingwood was annexed, Kingwood would not have been able to 
negotiate with Houston for services. Kingwood did try to contract 
with the city of Houston for services by offering $4 million per year in 
lieu of annexation, but was ultimately unsuccessful. 1 10 In the 
annexation's aftermath, the sentiments of Kingwood residents varied 
between those who were indifferent and those who claimed they would 
remain "bitter about it until the day [they die ] ."1 11 It is noteworthy that 
few .Kingwood residents felt that the annexation provided them with 
any significant benefit. 1 12 
1 65 .  Id 
1 66. See id § 43.052(f). 
1 67. See id § 43.053. 
1 68.  See id § 43.052(h) ("This section does not apply to an area proposed for 
annexation if: ( 1 )  the area contains fewer than 1 00 separate tracts of land on which one or 
more residential dwellings are located on each tract; (2) the area will be annexed by petition 
of more than 50 percent of the real property owners in the area proposed for annexation or by 
vote or petition of the qualified voters or real property owners as provided by Subchapter B; 
(3) the area is or was the subject of: (A) an industrial district contract under Section 42.044; 
or (B) a strategic partnership agreement under Section 43.075 1 ;  (4) the area is located in a 
colonia, as that term is defined by Section 2306.58 1 ,  Government Code; (5) the area is 
annexed under Section 43.026, 43.027, 43.029, or 43.03 1 ;  (6) the area is located completely 
within the boundaries of a closed military installation; or (7) the municipality determines that 
the annexation of the area is necessary to protect the area proposed for annexation or the 
muni��pality from: (A) imminent destruction of property or injury to persons; or (B) a 
co�d�tlon or u�e that constitutes a public or private nuisance as defined by background 
pnnc1ples ofnmsance and property law of this state."). 
1 69. See id §§ 43 .0562(a)(l ), 43 .0563(a). 
1 70. See Lee, supra note 1 4 1 . 
1 7 1 .  See 1d 
1 72 .  See 1d 
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A study of the Kingwood annexation provides valuable insight 
into the arguments for and against involuntary annexation as well as 
the verifiable links between a central city's boundary elasticity and 
regional economic growth. The Kingwood residents' rejection of 
involuntary annexation underscored their sense of entitlement to a 
separate municipal identity. They understood it and expressed that 
entitlement in the rhetoric of property rights. 
III. INVOLUNTARY ANNEXATION UNDER ATTACK: WHY? 
With involuntary annexations making up only 9% of the total 
annexations in North Carolina over the past twenty years, and with, 
presumably, similarly low levels in other states, it is hard to fathom 
how the issue has managed to generate such strong opposition. It has 
objectively aided central cities in maintaining the boundary elasticity 
necessary to keep up with urban sprawl and spread the benefits of a 
uniform governance regime across the ever-expanding territory of the 
modem metropolis. There are complex and varied reasons why 
involuntary annexation is so controversial and incites such passion 
among those who oppose it. These reasons extend far beyond very 
reasonable concerns about public service provisions. They implicate 
issues like taxation, which, while seemingly innocuous, is connected to 
broader sentiments about the role of government and social and 
economic redistribution that has animated American political debate 
for some decades. To a considerable degree, the staunch opposition to 
involuntary annexation is rooted in a complex set of beliefs, historic 
currents, and sociopolitical realities, all related to the meaning of 
municipal boundaries in the contemporary, American metropolitan 
experience. 
Involuntary annexation essentially subordinates local prerogatives 
on the formation and refonnation of municipal boundaries to larger 
state-centric land use and development needs. The favoring of state­
centric organization as opposed to locally driven organization reflects 
the state's essential role in safeguarding the interests of all citizens and 
thereby accounting for the · externalities produced through the local 
land use decisions of one community vis-a-vis another. While the 
representative structure of state government allows local communities 
to impact state legislation, localism casts state government and local 
government as inherently disconnected and oppositional forums. In 
today's political culture, the exercise of state government autonomy 
over land use and boundary management-expressed through 
involuntary annexation-is popularly understood as an overreach of 
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government, a breach of property rights, and a suppression of voting 
rights. 1 13 
Such interpretations reflect both the historical and symbolic 
import of municipal boundaries in American society and in popular 
conceptions of the role of government in defining and enabling 
community. They reflect the manner in which localism has become 
entrenched in the public consciousness as well as the growing 
antistatist sentiment in American political culture that has undermined 
government legitimacy and, in turn, the ability of governments to 
safeguard the public welfare. 114 
The backlash against involuntary annexation is not driven solely 
by impassioned lay folk or misguided notions about constitutional 
rights, however. There are valid and objective concerns with the 
design and operation of some involuntary annexation regimes that 
implicate the same issues of equity and fairness at the core of the 
reasons in support of such laws. For instance, critics of involuntary 
annexation argue that such provisions fuel a bottom-line approach to 
annexation that leads municipalities to target wealthy areas for 
involuntary annexation while overlooking poorer areas where the cost 
to extend municipal services would exceed the amount of tax revenue 
received. 115 Also at issue are real concerns over the extension of 
municipal services into newly annexed areas and the ability of the 
annexing municipalities to deliver and maintain comparable services 
immediately upon annexation. Communities in areas slated for 
annexation have a right to question the ability of a municipality to 
deliver services it either fails to provide within its current jurisdiction 
or for which it has a poor track record of managing. 
There are other currents in the resistance to involuntary 
annexation, however, that are much less objective and rational. They 
1 73.  See, e.g., Chris Marie Farr, North Carolina Begins Debate over Forced Municipal 
Annexation, CHATHAM J. (Feb. 1 8, 201 1 ), http://www.chathamjournal.com/weekly/opinion/ 
letters/nc-debate-on-forced-annexation- 1 1 02 1 8  .shtml. 
174. Antistatism is in many ways connected to broader questions of federalism and 
states' rights. Modem conservatism is guided by a belief in limited government that is 
increasingly adopting libertarian positions on the role of state and federal governments in all 
aspects of society and the economy. Most recently, groups with ties to the Tea Party have 
been involved in mobilizing opposition to land use policies at the local level. See, e.g., Leslie 
Kaufman & Kate Zemike, Activists Fight Green Projects, Seeing UN Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
4, 2012, at A l .  
1 75 .  See Connolly, supra note 75, at 85-95 (discussing the communities of southern 
Moore County and the disparities between the affluent, predominately white areas that have 
been annexed by the mW1icipalities of Aberdeen, Southern Pines, and Pinehurst and the 
predominately black communities that comprise the unincorporated areas of the county). 
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reflect several ideological and historical undercurrents that have 
profoundly affected local government law and urban politics. They 
revolve around concerns about the bundle of rights that are perceived 
to be threatened by annexation. They are tied to the manner in which 
twentieth-century social, political, and cultural developments have 
been expressed through spatial organization, territorial expansion, and 
the cultural significance of both local government and metropolitan 
space. Those developments can be broadly organized into three 
groupings of social and political phenomena. 
First, localism has long shaped the scope of autonomy granted to 
municipalities by state legislatures, and the sociocultural drivers of 
localism have created the urgency and perceived high-consequence 
nature of the decision to leave central cities, or to locate anywhere, for 
that matter. Second, annexation is viewed as a tool for the expansion 
of government power through the expansion of local government 
boundaries. Consequently, much of the angst over involuntary 
annexation reflects a broader antistatist sentiment. The suspicion 
about centralized government has a delegitirnizing effect on the very 
role of government and, by extension, the role of public, redistributive, 
and collectivist institutions in regulating social life. 
Third, antistatism and localism have both influenced the growth 
of the notion of a property-right-based interest in municipal identity. 
The various movements against involuntary annexation implicate legal 
and policy issues at the intersection of local government law and 
property law theory. Laws affecting both private property and the 
organization of local government are largely the province of the states, 
subject to certain federal constitutional limitations. These two legal 
constructs-private property rights and autonomous local 
government--converge in the issue of localism and its enabling legal 
and policy underpinning, annexation. Together these political and 
popular understandings have developed into what can be viewed as a 
perceived right to municipal location-the belief that one is entitled to 
have their property located in a particular municipal jurisdiction and, 
consequently, that the infringement of that right through the adjustment 
of municipal boundaries is akin to an infringement of vested rights in 
private property. 
A. Localism in Context and the Sodocultural Drivers of Flight 
Localism encompasses the legal, scholarly, and political 
arguments in favor of greater local power and autonomy as well as the 
belief that democracy requires that governing power should be 
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devolved to the smallest territorial unit possible.176 Localism reflects 
concerns over the sovereignty of local governments and the processes 
through which that sovereignty is protected from unwanted state 
intrusion. Local legal autonomy is organized around local boundaries 
that delineate the reach of local tax policy pertaining to local property 
in service oflocal needs.111 
For several key reasons, localism looms large in the discourse 
around involuntary annexation. First, there are the aims of liberty, 
freedom, and autonomy as expressed through the ability of citizens to 
band together in voluntary and mutual associations with their 
neighbors to form communities through which democratic aims and a 
vision of the good life can be achieved. This dynamic of localism has 
significant cultural roots and reflects the legacy of civic republicanism 
and its ties to democratic citizenship, participation, and territory. 
Second, localism is chiefly concerned with scale-the ratio of 
democratic access and participatory experience to spatial and 
territorial proximity. Beyond a certain scale, the experience of 
democracy becomes more attenuated and the virtues of small 
government are arguably compromised in a practical sense. 
Regionally based associations of individuals allow for the convenient 
operation of democratic self-government. Localism posits that the 
appropriate scale for vesting authority over local and metropolitan 
affairs is the municipal government unit, as determined by boundaries 
set by a specific, self-defined community. 
The role that scale plays in the ideology of localism is easily 
understood through the example of a town hall or city council meeting. 
In that forum there are several dynamics at play: ( 1 )  the desire of 
citizens to enjoy meaningful participation and the very real time 
constraints within which that participation must be achieved, (2) the 
ability of elected representatives to manage constituent needs within a 
defined geographic area and within time and resource constraints, 
(3) the tension between group camaraderie and individual identity in 
the expression of community needs and values, and ( 4) the role of law, 
rules, process, and a shared regard for the sanctity of the forum that 
facilitate the local government experience. With each of those 
dynamics, there is a limit beyond which it is difficult, if not 
1 76 .  The philosophical and methodological forces behind metropolitan fragmentation 
in particular and the development of local government law in general are commonly 
understood as localism. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 12, at 444; Briffault, supra note 3, at 
1-6. 
1 77 .  See Briffault, supra note 3,  at 349. 
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impossible, for the aims of effective, responsive, and efficient 
government to be realized. 
Concerns about the appropriate scale of government reflect the 
values of competition, choice, experimentalism, and the 
decentralization of power that are sacrosanct in the American 
experience. What is often underestimated when considering the 
appropriate scale for effective local government, however, is the 
inherent spillovers and externalities of the regulatory decisions about 
land use, which are at the core of local government's functional 
purpose. Local governments are chiefly concerned with regulating 
land use because of the belief that the development and use of land can 
only be determined by those who live in close proximity to one another 
and therefore share the same territory. The location of broad 
regulatory authority over land use within the province of discrete 
municipal units of government does not appreciate this fundamental 
characteristic of land use policy. There is a fundamental indeterminacy 
in the relationship between extemality management and the need for 
discrete boundaries to define and delineate the limits of community 
and local power. The larger the territorial footprint, the greater the 
spillover of land use decisions within formal boundaries will be into 
areas outside of formal boundaries. Involuntary annexation addresses 
this head-on by providing the central cities in metropolitan regions the 
ability to extend boundaries to account more accurately for the 
distribution of metropolitan area burdens throughout the region. 
The third force at the core of localism's role in the controversy 
over involuntary annexation is the manner in which localism­
specifically through boundary policy-has served to operationalize 
and reinforce a social order organized around race and economic class. 
Race and class disparities color conceptions of the legitimacy of the 
redistributory functions of a centralized government. Because 
municipal boundaries have functioned to reinforce existing racialized 
and class-based systems of privilege and disadvantage, notions of the 
benefit and value to be derived from the annexation of one's land into a 
municipality involve assessments about the race and class identity of 
the annexing municipality itself and the potential impact that 
annexation might have on one's real or perceived property value. 
While increasing wealth and income inequality in the United States is 
a growing area of popular and political concern, it is in metropolitan 
areas that inequality is negotiated, and it is metropolitan areas that are 
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chiefly responsible for addressing wealth and income inequality and 
stratification. 178 
While municipal boundaries do not restrict the flow of goods, 
services, and ideas within a metropolitan area, they demarcate first­
class citizenship from more subordinate tiers. These particular aspects 
of municipal boundaries have added stigma to residence and place, 
signaling to the market those areas for investment and isolation. 119 
Annexation law is central to these processes and has, in effect, given a 
geographic character to race- and class-based politics. Additionally, 
past motives for annexation often have intentionally served to 
reproduce existing race and class inequality, resulting in metropolitan 
regions carved into racially and socioeconomically defined local 
government units. 180 Scholars have addressed the processes of 
"municipal underbounding," which are those annexation practices in 
which cities grow around or away from low-income minority 
communities in an effort to exclude them from municipal services and 
curtail their voting rights. 1 8 1 
With respect to economic class, there is an emerging intellectual 
and political discourse about growing income and wealth inequality in 
America. "[I]n 1928 the richest I percent of Americans received 23.9 
1 78.  See Richard H. McAdams, Economk Costs oflnequa/jty, 20 1 0  U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
23, 3 1 -33 (noting that more affluent populations are likely to segregate themselves into 
homogenous communities and inherently increase violent crime because of decreased 
funding for police protection in less-affiuent localities); Colloquium, Wealth Jnequa/jty a11d 
the Eroding Middle Class: A Confrrence of the University of North Carolina Center on 
Poverty, Work and Opportunity and the Amencan Constitution Society for Law and Policy, 
1 5  GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 4 1 1 (2008) (noting a variety of factors in income 
inequality including nonpayment of estate taxes, racial history, minimum wage reform, and 
social entitlement reform); Rana Foroohar, Stuck in the Middle, TIME (Aug. 1 5, 20 1 1 ), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9 1 7 1 ,2086853,00.html (noting that affluent 
individuals are able to escape taxation while impoverished individuals are thrown into greater 
poverty as a result of reductions in social benefits). 
1 79. See, e.g, Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of 
Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. I 193, 
1 208-09 (2008) (discussing the exclusionary ethos of constitutionalizing zoning laws and the 
manner in which municipalities gained power chiefly for the purpose of shaping their 
demographic makeup through exclusionary practices). 
1 80. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 2, at 938-42 (discussing "municipal 
underbounding" as a motivation for annexation and as a reflection of the race and class 
dimensions of municipal-boundary construction and reconstruction); Gillette, supra note l 
(discussing different theories and approaches to understanding the methodology of 
annexation and specifically promoting concurrent majorities as a method for conducting 
annexations). 
1 8 1 .  For a broader discussion on municipal underbounding, see, for example, 
Anderson, supra note 2, at 937-42. 
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perce.nt of the nation's total income."182 Those levels declined as New 
Deal reforms, the G.I. Bill, government support of homeownership 
and the Great Society programs expanded the circle of prosperity. By 
the late 1970s, the top 1 % earned 8% to 9% of America's total annual 
income. But after that, inequality began to widen again, and income 
reconcentrated at the top. "By 2007 the richest I percent were back to 
where they were in 1 928-with 23.5 percent of [total income 
d] ,,1 83 eame . 
Income inequality breeds social inequality, which increases social 
distance. When considering the growth of municipal fragmentation 
and the manner in which it replicates social inequality along race and 
class lines, the social distance created by income inequality takes on a 
territorial dimension. Many scholars argue that increased social 
distance reduces trust, which leads to provincial notions of community 
and linked fate.1 84 Furthermore, scholars have found that "the more a 
region is broken up into multiple governments [or municipal 
identities] , the more racially and economically segregated its housing 
market is and the slower its rate of regional economic growth."' ' '  
Intraregional fragmentation both originates from and exacerbates 
existing social stratification and weak economic growth profiles.' xr. 
The rise in income inequality corresponds with the spread of 
localism and municipal fragmentation. The laws affecting the 
formation and reformation of municipal boundaries are one of the 
many, seemingly neutral, legal regimes that ultimately reinforce 
geographic segregation and the maldistribution of income, wealth, and 
resources within metropolitan regions. 181 The cultural legitimacy 
associated with localism casts the long history of these government­
created and legally legitimized devices as an unfortunate but inevitable 
condition of the liberty associated with private property. The 
consequences of the historic racial barriers to property ownership, the 
property value premium placed on white neighborhoods, and the 
racialized allocation of locational equity are transferred intergenera-
1 82. Raymond H. Brescia, The Cost of Inequality: Social Distance, Predatory 
Conduct, and the Financial Cn:Sis, 66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 641 ,  658 (201 1). 
1 83 .  Id 
1 84. See, e.g., id at 665 (discussing the role of trust in economic exchanges and the 
role of social distance in the erosion of the trust relationships necessary to prevent predatory 
behavior in economic exchanges). 
1 85. Rusk, supra note 1 6, at 2 (citing DAVID Y. MILLER, THE REGIONAL GOVERNING OF 
METROPOLITAN AMERlCA 1 26-28 (2002)). 
1 86. See, e.g., Tyson, supra. note 2. 
187. See, e.g., Audrey G. Mcfarlane, The Properties of Instab1Jity: Markets, 
Predation, Racia}jzed Geogra.phy, and Property Law, 201 1 Wrs. L. REv. 855, 91 1 .  
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tionally, and their impacts are cumulative. These race and class 
divisions are not just descriptive facets of localism's effects-they are 
essential components to the social investment in localism and its 
resilience as the logic driving the organization and methodology of 
metropolitan politics. 
It is certainly possible to overstate the influence of localism as the 
sole driver of location preferences of individuals and firms and of the 
desire to manipulate boundary law in service of those preferences. 
Increasingly, urban scholars are highlighting the role that 
"agglomeration economics" plays in shaping these preferences and the 
resulting decisions.188 While the agglomeration economics analysis 
offers much toward understanding the logic of location in cities, 
agglomeration processes are reflecting, to some degree, imbedded 
social and cultural dynamics that operate subconsciously and 
. I 189 unconscious y. 
Localism does not only benefit those with the most economic, 
social, or political power, either. For instance, the rise of black mayors 
in American cities at the end of the civil rights era was facilitated by 
majority-minority voting coalitions built around the racial redistri­
bution of population in metropolitan areas. Black communities, and 
disfavored minorities in general, have benefited politically when 
municipal-boundary law allows them to create voting majorities within 
defined territories. The resulting electoral power facilitates 
meaningful, albeit short-term, progress and provides black citizens job 
opportunities in municipal government that are otherwise unavailable 
in areas where they lack meaningful majorities. The very worthy aims 
of increasing minority political power and undermining the 
fragmentation that contributes to minority economic disempowerment 
are often in conflict. 190 Ultimately, the manner in which the 
redistributionary import of local tax policy magnifies long-standing 
racial disparities in wealth and resources renders the voting majorities 
1 88 .  See, e.g. , CLAYIDN P. GILLETTE, LOCAL REDISTRIBUTION AND LOCAL 
DEMOCRACY: INTEREST GROUPS AND THE COURTS 99 (20 1 1  ); EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, 
AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM 5 (2008). 
1 89 .  The manner in which race, class, religion, and sexual identity operate 
subconsciously in a manner that drives decision making both at the individual level and at the 
firm level deserves more consideration in the agglomeration economics discourse. For an 
understanding of how unconscious bias operates in the racial context, see, for example, 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with 
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3 1 7  ( 1987). 
1 90 .  See generally Kristen Clarke, Voting Rights & City-County Consolidations, 43 
Hous. L. REV. 62 1 (2006) (arguing that city-county consolidations do not take into account 
the dilution of minority voting strength). 
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created from this racial localism a hollow prize for minority 
communities. 
B. Antistatism and the Local Government Legitimacy Cnsis 
Involuntary annexation is popularly understood as a direct threat 
to the freedom associated with location choice and the manner in 
which annexation law facilitates that choice. What many find so 
offensive and threatening about involuntary annexation is that it grants 
a government body unilateral or near-unilateral power to reshape the 
legal boundaries of communities not under its control. That not only 
offends the communitarian spirit at the heart of localism, but also its 
libertarian leanings. Opponents of involuntary annexation view it as 
an egregious example of government overreach. A local paper in 
North Carolina captured this sentiment when Keith Bost, an opponent 
of involuntary annexation, stated: "Forced annexation is against every 
principle and idea of our Founding Fathers and our Constitution . . . .  
We have to pay taxes to people we were never allowed to vote for or 
against."191 His comments capture both the depth of conviction and the 
misconceptions at the heart of the backlash to involuntary annexation. 
They rely heavily on a mythology about American democracy that 
over-simplifies and misunderstands the ever-present dynamics of 
scale, jurisdiction, and the primacy of the police power as constant 
influences on the meaning of private liberty. They underestimate the 
relative constructedness of municipal boundaries, the position of 
localities as state instrumentalities, and their relationship to voting 
rights. 
The notion of government as an expression of collective liberty 
and as having legitimate authority to regulate and redistribute has, to 
some degree, always existed as a controversial and contested position 
in American life. Debates about the proper role and scope of 
government, primarily at the federal level, but also at the state and 
local level, have been present in every phase of the development of 
American democracy. The healthy suspicion of centralized 
government dates back to the arguments surrounding the ratification of 
the Constitution.192 Prior to World War II, twentieth-century 
progressivism emphasized the role of the state in creating institutions 
1 9 1 .  See Christensen, supra note 7 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) . 
. 
192. In Federalist Number 10, James Madison argued in favor of a strong, centralized 
n�t10�a� government to counterbalance the tendencies in state and local governments to 
d1scnmmate against and oppress disfavored minority groups. See, e.g, THE FEDERALIST No. 
10 (James Madison). 
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that would promote the public interest. 193 In the face of growing 
totalitarianism abroad, however, progressivism after World War II was 
curbed amidst concerns that an expanded and strengthened central 
government created the preconditions for totalitarianism.194 This has 
degenerated considerably, however, and the movements to oppose 
involuntary annexation reflect, in some measure, a broader, deeper, 
antistatist chord in contemporary American society. 
In 2003, 39% of Americans polled responded that the federal 
government had too much power, and that number increased to 5 1  % in 
2009.195 A 20 1 0  study found that more than seven out of ten 
Americans "use a word or phrase that is clearly negative when 
providing a top-of-mind reaction to the federal government."1% These 
views reflect the unstable prism through which the public 
conceptualizes the balance between central government authority and 
individual liberty and how that conception colors their view of the 
legitimacy of government altogether. 
The decision over the appropriate scope or scale for centralized 
government may indeed result in a contraction of governmental 
authority or purview. This does not constitute a rejection of the 
legitimacy of government, however. It is this distinction that separates 
the debates about the appropriate scope of government in the early part 
of the twentieth century from the rhetoric and ideology of late­
twentieth-century society that reject the legitimacy of government that 
is based, in part, on an overreliance on individualism, property rights, 
and laissez-faire economics as fixed, essential, and unchanged or 
unchanging components of the American experience. 
While localism expresses a preference for small-scale 
government as the most legitimate forum for democracy, antistatism is 
1 93 .  Many of the legislative reforms enacted during the New Deal substantially 
regulated the free market in unprecedented ways for the American economy. The result was 
the development of a robust social safety net that continues to characterize American life 
today-specifically for the American middle class. The most important legislation from the 
period was the 1 935 Social Security Act, which established a system of insurance for old age, 
unemployment insurance, and welfare benefits for such protected groups as dependent 
children and the handicapped. This legislation formed the basis for the modem welfare state. 
See Social Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-27 1 ,  49 Stat. 620 ( 1 935). 
1 94. See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The History of the Public/Private Distinction, 130 
U. PA. L. REV. 1423, 1427 (I 982). 
195.  See Frank Newport, Amencans More Likely To Say Govemment Doing Too 
Much, GALLUP (Sept. 2 1 ,  2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/ 1 23 1 0 1/americans-likely-say­
government-doing-too-much.aspx. 
1 96. Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans ' Image of "Federal Govemment" Mostly Negative, 
GALLUP (Oct. 1 1 ,  20 10), http://gallup.com/poll/ 143492/americans-image-federal-govemment­
mostly-negative.aspx. 
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highly suspicious o f  any government action and sees the collective 
liberty expressed through democratic government largely as an 
illegitimate infringement upon private liberty and the free working of 
private markets. As is the case in traditional federalism debates, at 
issue is where decision-making power should lie among competing, 
interrelated, and, in some cases, overlapping governmental units. The 
decision to locate decision-making authority in one forum or the other 
engenders sharp sentiments not only against the selected forum, but 
against the notion of divided government altogether. With regard to 
local governments, involuntary annexation is one answer to the 
question of what is the proper decision-making forum for municipal­
boundary decisions and which autonomous entity or being-the 
municipal government or the individual property owner-state law 
should privilege in decisions about the placement of municipal 
boundaries. Like so many others, this choice about the appropriate 
governmental forum for decision-making authority is germane to the 
democratic system, as opposed to being in violation of its letter or 
spirit as involuntary annexation opponents might suggest. 
The fight against involuntary annexation in many ways mirrors 
the ideological positions and historical interpretation anchoring 
antistatism. Both can be understood as part of the cumulative, 
ideological fallout resulting from the way certain twentieth-century 
sociopolitical developments have been politicized in the popular 
consciousness. In post-World War II America, support for a strong 
central government eroded due to two defining events in American 
political, economic, and social life: the federal government's 
intervention in the financial markets and economic sphere through the 
Great Society-era reforms and initiatives and the federal government's 
intervention in the social sphere through its involvement in race 
relations. The latter set of events-the intervention of federal courts in 
securing civil rights-is the most controversial and set the stage for 
decades of antistatist political rhetoric and systematic withdrawal of 
the federal government's presence in American life.197 
197. There is an extensive body of literature on the manner in which the civil rights era 
backlash shaped the public's perception of the role, effectiveness, and legitimacy of the 
federal government. The 1 960s civil rights legislation and jurisprudence generated a 
backlash that organized itself into a political movement and rhetorical regime that began 
framing its race, class, and economic agenda in the context of a federal government, whose 
reach and expansive power limited individual freedom and choice. Known popularly as 
"states' rights," profederalism movements in the twentieth century were largely spurred by 
'.ormer Confederate states' commitment to maintaining Jim Crow legal regimes free from the 
mterference of the federal government, especially the federal courts. The courts' expansive 
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Conservative political theorists have called into question many 
twentieth-century reforms and institutions that have expanded the 
scope of government in service of the aims of collective liberty.198 
These reforms include zoning, rent control, workers' compensation, 
and progressive taxation.199 Zoning and progressive taxation go to the 
heart of local government's functions and its real and perceived 
impacts on individual liberty. They shape the composition of local 
communities in a way that trumps the preferences of groups of people 
desiring to order bounded communities and the built environment 
according to their personal tastes, preferences, and biases, as well as 
prior patterns of inequality and social stratification. 
Just as suburbanization was aided by the devolution of boundary 
policy to local governments from state hands in states that abandoned 
involuntary and involuntaryesque modes of annexation policy, it also 
spurred the increased privatization of community as an even further­
reaching method of protest. This has operated to spur what has been 
termed the "secession of the successful": the self-alienation, of those 
who can afford to do so, from public institutions, namely public 
schools, public parks, public services, and public government. 200 These 
communities are united by income, consumer preferences, and a 
concern for the preservation and the continued growth of property 
values. Through the use of state and local government-boundary 
policy, they create enclaves where their tax dollars can go to support 
vision of the regulatory power afforded to government under the Constitution was understood 
as an affront to liberty in a nation less than a century removed from a Civil War that was 
popularly understood as a contest over federalism and states' rights. For a broader analysis 
and discussion of these developments, see, for example, Christopher J. Tyson, At the 
Intersection of Race and History: The Unique Relationship Between the Davis Intent 
Requirement and the Crack Laws, 5 0  How. L.J. 345, 367-70 (2007) (discussing the Nixon-era 
conservative movement's deployment of facially race-neutral language to rhetorically frame 
policy proposals that potentially could have the same social import as the invalidated Jim 
Crow regime while giving the backlash to the civil rights' rhetmical legitimacy and 
mobilizing it for electoral success), and J. Clay Smith, Jr., Shifts of Federalism and Its 
Implications !Or Civil Rights, 39 How. L.J. 737 ( 1 996) (discussing the civil rights implications 
ofUnited States v. Lopez, 5 14 U.S. 549 ( 1 995)). 
1 98. Calls from conservatives for a diminished role for government have informed 
debates over private property rights. In his oft-cited 1 985 book Takings: Pn.vate Property 
and the Power of Eminent Domain, Richard Epstein argues that the Framers of the 
Constitution codified their beliefs on the limitations of governmental power in the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which says that "private property" cannot be taken for public 
use "without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V; RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: 
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1 985). 
1 99. See Epstein, supra note 1 98. 
200. See Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successfii/, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 1991) 
(Magazine), http://www.nytimes.com/ 1 99 1 10 1/20/magazine/secession-of-the-successful.htrnl. 
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their specific needs. Given that their income allows for a reduction in 
the government services required by less-affluent segments of society, 
their governments are relatively lean and their communities have few 
unmet needs.201 In the minds of many, this dynamic only validates the 
widely held belief in the ineptness of traditional public institutions. 
Privatization encompasses the processes and policies that devolve 
traditionally publicly owned and operated sectors of the economy and 
civil life to private hands, as a method for organizing civil society. In 
the latter quarter of the twentieth century, there was a rise in the 
number of private communities and in the development of legal 
innovations at the local level to effect those changes. The rise in 
common-interest communities reflects these developments as well as 
the decreasing ability of municipal governments to provide services 
and community amenities. Privatization has spurred a retreat from 
investment in the public sphere, while the specter of that disinvestment 
unfairly undermines the public's faith in the role of government. There 
exists today a considerably high level of confidence in consumer 
choice as a means of identifying value in spheres long thought to be 
distinctly public. Public goods are increasingly being transferred into 
private hands, and, as such, are becoming chiefly the province of those 
who support and, in turn, enjoy the benefit. 202 The movement toward 
privatization in state and local government reflects not only persistent 
inefficiencies in the delivery of government services but also a guiding 
logic that public institutions as a rule are inferior to private, market­
based ones.203 The logic of privatization serves as a powerful stimulant 
to the current antistatist disposition of Americans vis-a-vis democratic 
public institutions.204 
201 .  Seeid 
202. The primary form of privatization involves, for instance, electric companies or 
airlines being sold by government agencies to private bidders. 
203. For a broader discussion on privatization in local government law, see generally 
Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Hilter Privatization Trends in the United States: Human 
Rights, National Security, and Public Stewardship, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y REV. 
785 (2009) (arguing that privatization of water and public water systems pose 
underappreciated risks to both public rights and national security in the United States, and 
suggesting limiting private control over water sources and systems, encouraging regulation of 
privatization processes, and recommending more accountability from local governments as 
trustees of water resources for the public). See also Celeste Pagano, Proceed with Caution: 
Avoiding Hazards in Toll Road Privatizations, 83 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 35 1 (2009) (discussing 
the trends leading to the modem movement toward privatization and discussing the benefits 
and drawbacks of privatized toll roads). 
204. Identifying the logic of privatization as a threat to public institutions does not 
undermine the value of private, market-driven forces in public life. It does not even require 
the invalidation of certain market principles in the operation of government. 
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The attack on involuntary annexation reflects many currents in 
the contemporary, national, conventional wisdom regarding the role of 
government, abstract (and at times confused) notions of constitutional 
rights and "freedom," and the role of taxation as income and wealth 
redistribution for the maintenance of the public good. Suburban 
conununities view themselves as independent sovereigns whose 
freedom to govern is oppositional to that of the central city. This 
mirrors debates occurring in the context of federalism. In our 
collective imagination, federalism envisions states as independent 
sovereigns against a separate central government. Scholars are 
challenging this view, contending instead that states are less like 
sovereigns and more like servants that operate as part of a complex 
system of "national, state, and local actors implementing federal 
policy."205 Outside of scholarly circles, however, there is little 
appreciation for the nation's system of state and local government 
interdependence and integration. Many view state and local 
governments as functioning solely to provide minorities a distinct and 
separate sphere of autonomy and power apart from the center. The 
intergovernmental relationships under this conception are inherently 
oppositional and confrontational. When matched with widely held 
notions of freedom as being synonymous with autonomy and 
exclusivity, it is possible to conceptualize the role antistatism plays in 
deepening the commitment of many to devolving control over 
boundary policy to the smallest unit of government possible. 
Current debates about the nature of federalism further illuminate 
our understanding of the presence of antistatism in the involuntary 
annexation context by exposing the flawed premises undergirding 
notions of sovereignty in the first place. The autonomy gained from 
the formation of separate government or the resistance to the 
expansion of the territory of another government does not in any 
meaningful way trump the realities of federal, state, and local 
interconnectedness. As Heather Gerken has observed, local govern­
ments are not outsiders but rather insiders and parties to the 
implementation of state and federal policy.206 Their ability to break off 
into separate communities does not effect a rejection of the central 
government, but rather only shifts the dynamics of their operation 
205. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 549, 1557 
(20 12); see also Heather K. Gerken, Federalism All the JM!y Down, 1 24 HARV. L. REV. 4 
(2010) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism] ("[E]ven as scholars reject a sovereignty account, 
sovereignty continues to shape the way we think about 'Our Federalism."'). 
206. See Gerken, Federalism, supra note 205, at 1 3- 14. 
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within a complex apparatus wherein the central government is, well, at 
the center. 
C Property Rights Theory of Municipal Identity 
The outrage over involuntary annexation is essentially outrage 
over the taking of the choice to express individual identity, group 
identity, status, and ownership through municipal identity. While there 
is no right to local self-government, localism is expressed in the moral, 
rhetorical, and methodological framework of property rights. As has 
been the case in the involuntary annexation battles cited in Part II of 
this Article, most argwnents against involuntary annexation are 
anchored in property rights frameworks that equate the freedom to join 
with others and organize into new municipalities with fundamental 
notions of land-based property rights. Central to the opposition to 
involuntary annexation is the notion that annexation regimes pose a 
substantive threat to individual property rights. 
Unlike eminent domain, zoning, or other legal regimes that 
impact the use or the rights associated with private land ownership, 
annexation does not impact private property rights in any meaningful 
way. All land is and has always been subject to regulation by a number 
of governing bodies, and land located within the governmenta l 
subunits of state government is subject to the powers of the state, 
however they are delegated and enforced.201 States empower their 
municipalities to regulate and tax the land within their borders . 
Whether that land lies within an incorporated city or within the 
unincorporated areas of a county or parish, it ultimately falls under the 
province of the state. The change in classification of land from being 
located within the unincorporated areas of a county or parish to being 
located within the boundaries of a city or other municipality simply 
does not alter the fundamental relationship between the land and the 
state, which has uncontested authority, either directly or indirectly, 
through its subunits to regulate and tax the land.208 
207. See generally WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1 - 19 ( 1996) (rebutting the misconception that pervasive 
regulations were not present in nineteenth-century America). 
208. Those who oppose involuntary annexation argue that involuntary annexation 
somehow represents an overextension of the historic manner in which property rights have 
been regulated. This mythology undergirds much of conservative thought and rhetoric 
regarding property rights but misrepresents the regulatory ethos of pre-New Deal American 
life. For a broader discussion, see generally NOVAK, supra note 207 (describing the laws and 
regulations of nineteenth-century America). 
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The movement to repeal involuntary annexation statutes has as 
much to do with substantive disagreements over the scope and 
operation of annexation regimes as it does with longstanding and 
deeply culturally embedded conceptions of private property rights. 
Just as private property boundaries grant the individual the right to 
exclude others from the bundle of rights and social, political, and 
economic benefits tied to private property, municipal boundaries serve 
an exclusionary function by determining who gets to participate in the 
redistribution of a community's resources. When considering the role 
municipal boundaries play in shaping notions of community, the 
exclusionary features of private property ownership are elevated as the 
essential features worthy of attention and protection. This leads to a 
crisis of political discourse where notions of private property rights are 
expressed through the formation and reformation of municipal 
boundaries. 
There are a number of social constructs that, through their 
development and popular understanding over time, have assumed 
characteristics similar to property rights. The idea of property in the 
public consciousness is rooted in "popularly understood and instinctive 
notions of both personal identity and the inviolability of ownership."209 
While local sovereignty is not recognized in our constitutionalism, 
there has emerged a species of property rights borne of human 
experience. Since the nation's founding, there has existed the notion 
that property and citizenship are intrinsically linked. This is the ethos 
of civil republicanism and the theory of property rights and liberty 
held by the nation's Founders.210 The relationship between private 
property rights and the perceived right to autonomous local 
government has taken on popular meanings that are not always 
grounded in actual law but have a real impact on politics. These 
perceived rights form the ideological basis for that which is essentially 
a socially constructed right to municipal identity. 
209 . David Fagundes, Property Rhetonc and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
652, 655-56 (201 0) . 
. 2 1 0 .  D�ng the early years of the nation, there existed the belief that property pro�1�ed not JUSt a stake in the action but also a sense of responsibility, a concern about the 
stability of goverrunent , and a lack of dependence on others that were essential for an 
intelligent , voting population. Land ownership was tied to civic identity-the right to vote 
and h?ld �lected office were tied to property ownership, which is the essence of civic 
repubhcamsi:i. Parts of this theory began to break down in the early years of the nineteenth 
century, particularly those parts dealing with the political rights of nonlandholding men. See, 
e.g., RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS lN PROPERTY 17- 1 9  (3d ed. 
2010). 
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Legal scholars have theorized the manner in which several social 
constructs, identities, and institutions have acquired the characteristics 
of property with regard to their social meanings.21 1  The framework of 
these analyses is applicable to understanding municipal identity as 
property. Municipal identity as property confers upon a community 
the legal legitimation of expectations of power and control that have 
been enshrined in state law without regard for the impact of that power. 
If the right to municipal location has, in the public's consciousness, 
developed into a constructive set of property rights, then it follows that 
the corresponding sociopolitical context and legal meaning requires it 
be afforded the most important and exalted constitutional protection­
or something close to it. When we understand municipal identity in 
this vein, we can see more clearly the lengths to which individuals and 
society as a whole are willing to go to protect and preserve what they 
perceive to be a set of property rights. 
Elevating involuntary annexation to a threat to the personal 
liberty associated with location choice requires the construction of a 
right to location choice that has the force and legitimacy of law. The 
idea of municipal identity as property, therefore, lies at the intersection 
of the manner in which the protection of private property rights and the 
development of suburban identity has organized around and is 
culturally understood as the protection of the American home. 
Socially and culturally, the home is the most intimate and the most 
private sphere of human activity. The family is thought to anchor 
American society, and the family is organized around the home. The 
sanctity of the home and its durability as a vehicle for family wealth 
creation hinge on the security and stability that flows from property 
rights. 
Courts have reinforced the primacy of the home through the 
manner in which they have legitimated and given constitutional cover 
to local zoning and land use regulations. In Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty, the United States Supreme Court opined that the 
separation of residential, business, and industrial uses would increase 
the safety and security of the home.212 The Court went on to comment 
specifically on the development of apartments, characterizing them as 
2 1 1 .  See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whjteness as Property, I 06 HARV. L .  REv. 1707 ( 1993) 
(exploring the development of whiteness as a property right and presenting a framework for 
how property rights are socially constructed even if not formally recognized in law); Goutam 
U. Jois, Mania/ Status as Property: Toward a New Jurisprudence for Gay Rights, 4 1  HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 509 (2006) (arguing that marriage should be afforded the same degree of 
constitutional protection as property rights). 
212.  See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1 926). 
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parasitic to the residential character of a district.2 13  In Village of Belle 
Te1Te v. Boraas, the Supreme Court again singled out the private, 
single-family residence for special protection by articulating the 
sanctity of family values in a manner that implicitly favors the 
traditional, nuclear family ideal.214 
The residence-centric underpinnings of municipal identity as 
property fundamentally reject the reality of interdependence and the 
complex interplays between social and economic spheres of life­
particularly at the local level. Acknowledging this interdependence 
does not require undermining private property as a normative position, 
nor is socioeconomic equity or redistributive policy necessarily at odds 
with private property. 215 There are multiple characterizations of 
government and its manifestation or representation of the public 
interest.216 What is clear, however, is that government, by its very 
nature, is designed to socially and economically redistribute individual 
property and welfare for the advancement of the broader community. 
In the context of local government, that redistribution occurs through 
the development of infrastructure and the delivery of public services 
that make not only community possible but social and economic 
relations as well. The home and family values are the primary 
beneficiaries of these redistributive processes, for they benefit most 
from the stability and consistency that result from these redistributive 
systems. 
Just as society protects the owner's interests in land, so too does 
society curtail the absoluteness of property rights for the promotion of 
the best interests of society.211 This axiom has been acknowledged by 
courts, and the necessity of basing judgments on the physical and 
social facts of a particular time and place warrants reconsideration of 
2 1 3 .  Seeid 
2 1 4. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 ,  9 ( 1 974) ("The police power is 
not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones 
where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the 
area a sanctuary for people."). 
2 1 5 . In articulating and defending the necessary redistributive role of government in 
relation to more fundamentalist notions of private property rights, I appreciate both extremes 
of �he debate and make no attempt in this Article to undermine broadly recognized and 
socially embedded understandings of private property rights. For a broader discussion, see 
generally Jeffrey A Schoenblum, Myth ofOwnership/Myth of Government, 22 VA. TAX REV. 
555 (2003) (reviewing LlAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OwNERSHlP: IA.XES 
AND JUSTICE (2002)). 
2 1 6. See id at 565-66 (discussing the various models of public-private interaction 
between governments and the market and governments and private citizens). 
2 1 7. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 373 (N.J. 197 1 ). 
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the line between individual and collective rights in regulating 
property. 218 
Opponents of involuntary annexation frame their opposition in 
terms of liberty and the lack of liberty; however, the consideration of 
involuntary annexation does not involve a zero-sum conception of 
liberty. Rather, it is inherently an issue of which type of liberty we are 
favoring, understanding that both collective liberty and individual 
liberty are compromised in the involuntary annexation regime. 
The control of land uses at the macro scale has evolved to be 
understood as a valid "exercise of the public police power [as opposed 
to the] exercise of pn·vate liberty by neighboring landowners acting 
together, out to control the landscapes that they inhabit."2 19 Municipal 
fragmentation, however, begs the question of whether the private 
liberty expression of municipal location choice should be subject to 
the public police power to prevent the negative impact of municipal 
fragmentation on metropolitan political organization and operation. 
The liberty traditionally associated with property rights lies on both 
sides of the argument. Determining where the line is drawn-like all 
other laws and policies that support a property rights regime-is a 
matter of lawmaking.220 
If one subscribes to the view that property rights result from 
utilitarian calculations as to what can be owned, what it means to own. 
and the relationship between private ownership and collective liberty, 
then the right to form essentially private communities through 
municipal incorporation should be subject to evaluation against the 
metropolitan community's right to stem the negative effects of 
municipal fragmentation.221 If a key value of a property rights system 
is to fulfill social needs, then involuntary annexation's ability to limit 
fragmentation must be considered an equally important, if not more 
important, social need. 
To quote property theorist Eric Freyfogle, "[E]ach landowner's 
power requires testing independently, to see whether it brings overall 
social benefits."222 Private property rights are good when they yield 
overall benefits that are widely spread for people generally.223 
2 1 8. See id 
2 19. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 95 
(20 1 0) (discussing the existence of the private control of land through homeowners' 
associations and special districts). 
220. Id 
22 1 .  See id at 1 1 3-14. 
222. See id. at 1 1 5  n. 1 5 1 .  
223. See id. at l 14-15. 
344 TULANE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 87 :297 
Freyfogle 's analysis of property rights is instructive for understanding 
the value of involuntary annexation. If one accepts that central cities 
are the anchors for land use management, sociocultural identity, and 
economic development needs of the metropolitan region and that the 
ability to pursue the necessary redistributive aims critical to tending to 
these and other issues requires that the central city have a privileged 
prerogative over boundary formation and reformation throughout the 
metropolitan area, then accordingly, one must acknowledge that the 
absence of a meaningful ability to involuntarily alUlex land is a 
massive restriction on the liberty of the metropolitan community. 
The localist motivations for municipal autonomy are often 
dressed up in libertarian garb, but these pretentions are easily 
dismissed when considered in the context of the municipal formation 
that is pursued. The reality is that localists seeking municipal 
autonomy from central cities are not rejecting centralized government 
per se, but rather they are rejecting the current composition of the 
spaces they flee. They seek to express property rights in municipal 
identity through the exclusionary conception of property. This 
exclusionary conception, or the boundary approach, is by itself 
inadequate because it says nothing about the owner's rights of use in a 
thing.224 It risks conflating exclusive rights with the right to exclude.225 
Central to annexation law and annexation battles is the self­
determination of the residents in the area to be annexed. The self­
determination trope is seductive even for the courts; its legitimacy is 
grounded in local government law. In City of Jackson v. City of 
Ridgeland, decided by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the dissenting 
opinion painted a picture of annexation power that distorts that which 
is established constitutional jurisprudence.226 Writing for the dissent, 
Mississippi Supreme Court Justice William Joel Blass stated: 
There is much discussion about the path of the city's growth, but I 
have not seen a decision which adequately explains why cities have the 
right to grow by absorbing those who do not wish to be absorbed. 
These hapless souls are not consulted. They are merely selected to 
provide additional revenues to be expended by those who have been 
elected by others and for purposes which probably will benefit, 
primarily, those who took them in. When cities are concerned we 
abandon the hallowed concept of democracy that the just powers of the 
224. See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusi0ty in Property Law. 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 
275, 277 (2008). 
' 
225. Seeid 
226. 551 So. 2d 861, 869-7 0  (Miss. 1 989) (Blass, J., dissenting). 
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government are derived from the consent of the governed. Nations 
which extend their boundaries without the consent of the occupants of 
the new territory are condemned as aggressors. Cities are merely 
vibrant and growing, even if every citizen brought in is screaming in 
007 
protest.·-
The Ridgeland dissent hinges upon reconceptualizing the municipality 
as a nation-state and, accordingly, endowing it with the inviolable 
rights of sovereignty that are commonly associated with the nation­
state. It is easy to expose the manner in which this runs counter to 
long-standing jurisprudence on the identity of local governments,rn but 
the impulse for attempting to reconstruct the legal status of local 
governments in this manner illustrates the cultural draw of municipal 
identity as property. 
Several state courts have affirmed that the extension or 
contraction of a municipality's boundaries is, without exception, purely 
a political matter entirely within the power of the legislature of the 
state to regulate. Furthermore, these courts have clarified that the 
question of due process of law or the taking of property without 
compensation has no application to the annexation of territory to a 
municipality.229 Those who contend that involuntary annexation power 
abridges the right to vote of those living in an area proposed for 
annexation have also been rebuffed by state courts. Several courts 
have held that "the right to vote does not include a right to compel the 
state to provide any electoral mechanism whatever for changes of 
municipal organization."230 
227. Id 
228. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 ( 1907) (discussing the nature of 
the relationship between municipal corporations and their residents). 
229. See, e.g., State ex rel. Jordan v. City of Overland Park, 527 P2d 1340, 1 345 (Kan. 
1974); Lenox Land Co. v. City of Oakdale, 125 S.W 1089, 1091 (Ky. Ct. App. 1 9 10); State 
ex rel Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. Texas City, 303 S.W2d 780, 783 (Tex. 1957). 
230. See Bd. of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 838 P2d 1 1 98. 
1204 (Cal. 1992) ("[W]hen the state has provided for the voters' direct input, the equal 
protection clause requires that those similarly situated not be treated differently unless the 
disparity is justified."); see also Green v. City of Tucson, 340 F.3d 891, 896-97 (9th Cir. 2003 ) 
("[T]here is no inherent right to vote on municipal incorporation under the federal 
constitution. However, once a state grants its citizens the right to vote on a particular matter, 
such as municipal incorporation, that right is protected by the Equal Protection Clause."); 
Hardin County v. City of Adamsville, No. 02A01-9203-CH-00084, 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 
60, at *13-14 (Ct. App. Jan. 20, 1993) ("The state, therefore at its pleasure, may modify or 
withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest 
it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with 
another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, 
conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against 
their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its 
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The notion of municipal identity as property weakens any 
conception of local government as a collective enterprise as opposed to 
a privatized one. Municipal boundaries implicate interests that are too 
fundamental to the fate of communities, the environ ment, and the 
distribution of resources w ithin metropolitan regions to be left to the 
self-interest-driven ethos of localism. Likewise, the consequences of 
municipal-boundary policy in the hands of local interests render 
metropolitan development and equity in too fragile a state. "Property 
rights serve human values."231 Likewise, municipal-boundary policy is 
the ly nchpin in the expression of human values through spatial 
organization and redistributive government. Just as property rights law 
has long embraced the inherent tension between individual and 
collective liberty in regulating property, localism must yield to 
statewide boundary policy that seeks governance-regime unifonnity 
over the largest territorial footprint reasonably possible to ensure that 
the redistributional impact of local government tax policy and power is 
equitably shared. 
IV. INVOLUNTARY ANNEXATION AND NEW REGIONALISM 
The states where involuntary annexation exists are actually the 
remaining vestiges of an urban policy consensus that acknowledges 
the essential role boundary law play s in shaping the metropolis. 
Involuntary annexation policies perform several functions and reflect a 
specific consciousness about the appropriate location for decision­
making authority on boundary management. 
First, involuntary annexation expresses a state's desire to impose 
regionally directed land use policy on its metropolitan areas in a 
manner that privileges the growth ambitions of central cities. Some 
may reject the prioritization of central cities above suburban ones as 
patently unfair and arbitrary. As central cities and suburban 
jurisdictions in some cases rival each other in size and character, 
decisions about central city prioritization may need to be handled on a 
case-by-case basis. But ultimately history and being first in time 
action to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the 
Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and property owners may, by 
such changes, suffer inconvenience, and their property may be lessened in value by the 
burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right, by contract or 
?therw_
ise, 
_
in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and there 
is nothmg � �e Federal Constitution which protects them from these injurious consequences. 
�e power 1s m the state, and those who legislate for the state are alone responsible for any 
llnJUSt or oppressive exercise of it."). 
23 1 .  State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1 971 ). 
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matter. As pro-business interests in the Houston-Kingwood 
annexation controversy realized, the infrastructural direction, social 
character, economic logic, and cultural ethos of metropolitan areas are 
largely driven by the central city. 
Second, involuntary annexation de-emphasizes the relationship 
between private property and municipal identity and favors collectivist, 
centralized notions of metropolitan land use and development that are 
more sustainable and produce more equitable arrangements. Land use 
in the modern metropolis-as with any system of property rights 
regulation-is defined by the need to identify, contain, and correct for 
spillover effects. Allowing groups of metropolitan residents the ability 
to deploy boundary policy for the purpose of limiting their 
participation in metropolitan area's wealth redistribution offends the 
social contract.2·12 Developing public infrastructure and mitigating 
spillover effects are at the core of cities' purpose. Just as zoning limits 
development by placing restrictions on what can be built where, 
boundaries perform a regulatory role in determining how taxes and 
resources will be distributed within discrete segments of the broader 
metropolis. Allowing residents to opt out of that shared enterprise will 
undermine the fate of metropolitan areas. 
Third, involuntary annexation expresses a conception that local 
autonomy is less concerned with local government as a territorially 
defined, autonomous, democratic polis but, rather, as an agent of the 
state's broader ambitions regarding land use and metropol itan 
economic development. This keeps localism in check. Broad, liberal 
conceptions of local power are appropriate for addressing and 
resolving any number of local disputes.  Zoning schemes, public 
decency laws, and expression of community needs through local 
politics are all examples of areas where local govermnents should have 
wide autonomy. But the competitive imperatives of cities require that 
their growth not be interrupted by provincial bands of citizens seeking 
token separation from central cities.233 
Last, involuntary annexation expresses a policy preference 
regarding the resolution of the competing goals of increasing boundary 
elasticity, maintaining the pace of economic development, and 
232. My use of the term "social contract" relates to the political theory commonly 
associated with the philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT OR PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL RIGHT (Charles M. Shercover ed., Signet 
Classics 1974) (1762). 
233 . For more information on the growth and competitive challenges confronting 
cities, see Tyson, supra note 2. 
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reducing social inequality. The ability of a municipality to annex land 
within its metropolitan region can be a key tool in limiting urban 
sprawl, municipal fragmentation, and mitigating the perpetuation of 
social divisions and associated stratification within a metropolitan 
region.234 It can also limit the intraregional discord that frustrates the 
coordination of regional economic development. The approaches to 
involuntary annexation in states like Kansas, Nebraska, and Tennessee 
show how concerns over property freedoms and the provision of 
infrastructure and services can be accommodated into a compre­
hensive plan. 
Despite these objective benefits and the existing state regimes, 
there is neither the political will nor the scholarly interest to expand or, 
at the very least, defend involuntary annexation. It has largely fallen 
out of favor with state and local government actors as the logic of 
localism has become more ingrained. This is also true in urban studies 
and with local government law scholars. While "Regionalism" is 
widely embraced, involuntary annexation is not regarded as part of the 
regulatory toolbox available to make Regionalism real. 
Regionalism has long been offered up as the antidote to localism. 
Regionalism proposals take many forms and generally can be aligned 
along a spectrum ranging from voluntary forms to involuntary, 
coercive forms. The voluntary end of the spectrum includes 
intergovernmental agreements that facilitate cooperative decision 
making between and among two or more governments and the 
development of regional authorities or other entities that manage and 
control certain local government functions, such as land use planning, 
transportation planning, and environmental regulation across a number 
of separate and autonomous local government units.235 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are annexation laws, limits 
on municipal incorporation within established metropolitan areas, 
consolidations, and other measures that impose Regionalism directives 
on localities through the force of state law. As a method for achieving 
regional gove1nance, annexation is thought to exist at the coercive or 
involuntary extreme. As a creature of state policy, its authority is not 
derived from local politics but rather state-level politics. Interlocal 
cooperative agreements, on the other hand, are entered into voluntarily 
by consenting local governments.236 
234. See id 
235 · See discussion supra note 1 3  (discussing the Twin Cities region) . 
. . . 
�36. Interlo�al agreements can take many forms, including regional service-sharing imtiatives and regional tax-sharing initiatives. Most major metropolitan areas and many 
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But these regional cooperative agreements and schemes, in most 
instances, do not alter the distribution of metropolitan problems and 
persistent socioeconomic disparities. If states have a vested interest in 
developing and advancing an urban policy regime that will secure the 
general welfare and economic fate of their metropolitan regions, then it 
follows that the delineation of those metropolitan units of government 
through policies that regulate the formation and reformation of 
boundaries must be central to the regime. If boundary formation and 
reformation is not appreciated as a core component of a statewide 
urban policy regime, or if it is separated out from a broader urban 
policy regime through the devolution of annexation decisions to local 
property owners, then the entire urban policy apparatus is weakened 
because, by its nature, it must exist at the state level as opposed to the 
local level. 
Regionalism has evolved into New Regionalism, which is 
centered around: "( 1)  equity and inclusion [among] self-defined 
territorial communities; (2) democratic participation;" and (3) the 
efficient and transparent delivery of government services and public 
goods.237 The New Regionalist agenda-like "old" Regionalism and 
other critiques of local government law and metropolitan governance 
generally-is concerned chiefly with presenting a methodological and 
structural counterweight to the tendency toward localism in local 
government law. In this vein, it is presented as "a law ref mm strategy 
that responds to local government law's failure to: ( 1 )  resolve cross­
border, multi-issue challenges; (2) promote regional equity amongst 
interdependent localities; and (3) foster participation and collaboration 
across local boundaries."238 
A key tenant of New Regionalist efforts is the establishment of 
"principally voluntary methods of promoting local government 
cooperation in metropolitan regions."239 Voluntary cooperation through 
horizontal governance measures is believed to be a sufficient vehicle 
for achieving regional objectives without broaching the difficult topic 
of governmental structure.240 This preference establishes a 
midsize ones employ some form of regional tax-sharing schemes. See Anita A. Summers, 
Regionalization Efforts Between Big Cities and Their Suburbs, in URBAN-SUBURBAN 
INTERDEPENDENCIES 1 8 1 ,  1 88-89 (Rosalind Greenstein & Wim Wiewel eds., 2000) 
(discussing a study of twenty-seven large metropolitan areas). 
237. Alexander, supra note 13, at 632 (citing Cashin, supra note 9, at 2028). 
238. Id al 633 .  
239. Frances Frisken & Donald F. Norris, Regionalism Reconsidered, 23 J. URB. A.FF. 
467, 468 (2001 ). 
240. See id 
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voluntary/involuntary rubric for understanding Regionalist proposals 
that overfocuses on the former because of the real and perceived 
political infeasibility of the latter. Therefore, in the context of New 
Regionalism, annexation itself has been referred to as a "radical 
approach."241 
The voluntary nature of the alternatives to annexation is the 
central challenge facing New Regionalist proposals. New Regionalist 
proposals must always contend with the cultural investment in localism 
that makes acquiescence to new, voluntary regional governance 
regimes as dubious as increased popular support for more top-down 
approaches such as involuntary annexation.242 
The commitment, both in local government law and New 
Regionalism, to equity and inclusion among "self-defined territorial 
communities" is at the core of the crisis existing within local 
government law. This self-definition aspect of territorial community 
boundary formation is an intrinsic component to any conception of 
local autonomy. The inclusion of "self-defined" in the definition of 
the communities New Regionalists seek to engage necessarily results 
in the reproduction, rather than the mitigation, of the forces underlying 
localism and consequently undermines the rationale supporting 
regional cooperation through structural autonomy-limiting measures. 
The overfocus on voluntary approaches seeks to achieve the 
benefits of centralization while preserving legally sanctioned, 
decentralized governance patterns. Governance uniformity increases 
economies of scale, reduces the social costs of fragmentation, limits 
externalities stemming from parochialism, and provides for greater 
consideration and provisions for minority and disadvantaged groups. 
Decentralization is good for many facets of local government law, but 
boundary management simply does not lend itself well to 
decentralized forms.243 
24 1 .  See David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, J 16  HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2262 
(2003) ("The most radical approach [to comba tting sprawl] would replace existing cities and 
suburbs with full-fledged regiona l governments, e i ther through the annexa t ion of outlying 
areas by the central c ity or consolida tion of a ll the jur isdict ions wi thin a metropolitan 
region."). 
242. Id 
243 .  See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, ''A Government of Limited and Enumerated 
Powers'�· In Defense ofUni ted Sta tes v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 780-84 ( 1 995). While 
Calabresi ultima tely argues tha t decentraliza tion poses more benefits than centralization, he 
notes that na tional governments a re more apt to solve certain problems such as ( 1 )  those 
problems tha t small uni ts cannot perform due to economies of sca le, (2) ensuring uni formity 
and thus a reduct ion of social  costs, (3) l imiting externalities, and (4) protecting minori ty 
popula tions. See id; see also DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1 995) 
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State annexation regimes should include provisions that give the 
central cities within metropolitan regions the unilateral ability to 
expand their borders when the health, vitality, solvency, economic 
development, and competitiveness of the metropolitan region is 
objectively at risk. These provisions must include meaningful 
opportunities for citizens in the area proposed for annexation to be 
aware of the proposed annexation, ensure that their service levels and 
the character of the services presently received are in no way 
diminished, and present objective reasons why they should be spared 
annexation within the context of disallowing defensive incorporation 
or similar preemptive actions and motivations. But these accom­
modations ultimately should be subordinate to a state's need to ensure 
the orderly, sustainable, and equitable development of its metropolitan 
regions. 
Central to the question of what the reach and nature of municipal 
power to annex adjacent and nearby lands should be is whether policy 
rationales-here, sound urban planning objectives-should play a role 
in deciding which liberties to protect and which to sacrifice. This 
requires determining where the line between where private property 
and liberty, as expressed by community-sanctioned policy aims, is best 
drawn. It is possible to see involuntary annexation as an antidote to the 
specter of private municipal developments created under the auspices 
of individual citizens seeking communities that match their particular 
needs and profile. Increased municipal fragmentation inevitably 
means private landowners acting together to create communities that 
limit the redistributory reach of their tax revenues, as opposed to a 
broader and more diverse demographic of citizens that may exist in a 
central city.244 
V. CONCLUSION 
Involuntary annexation can aid in the establishment of a new, 
metropolitan localism that recognizes the ability to achieve governance 
uniformity across the broadest territorial footprint possible as critical 
to the growth prospects for the metropolitan region. Through the 
adoption of policies that are conscious of the manner in which 
(discussing the need for a strong national authority and the necessity of federalism as a 
restraint on that authority); David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 5 1  
DUKE L.J. 377, 378 (20 0 1 )  (advocatin g for a more localized form o f  decision making in light 
of the rise of"new federa lism"). 
244. See Freyfogle , supra note 219, at 95 (discussin g the existence of the private 
control ofland through homeowners' associations and special districts). 
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municipal identity has been constructed into a property right .  
localism's stranglehold on the future prosperity and vitality of thl' 
American metropolis can be dismantled. New Regionalists, thercti.>rl'. 
have a vested interest in the defense and maintenance of involunta� 
annexation. While there are certainly well-reasoned justifications for 
focusing on more voluntary, bottom-up governance structures. 
involuntary annexation remains a potent tool for facilitating regional 
governance and is worthy of defense and preservation. 
